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ELECTION LAW AND 
WHITE IDENTITY POLITICS 
Joshua S. Sellers* 
 
The role of race in American politics looms large in several election law 
doctrines.  Regrettably, though, these doctrines’ analyses of race, racial 
identity, and the relationships between race and politics often lack 
sophistication, historical context, or foresight.  The political status quo is 
treated as race-neutral, when in fact it is anything but.  Specifically, the 
doctrines rely upon sanguine theories of democracy uncorrupted by white 
identity–based political calculations, while in fact such calculations, made 
on the part of both voters and political parties, are pervasive. 
In this Article, I appraise the doctrine pertaining to majority-minority 
voting districts, racial gerrymandering doctrine, the doctrine governing 
ballot access disputes, and campaign finance doctrine through the lens of 
white identity politics.  Drawing from research in political science, 
sociology, and history, I argue that these doctrines are blighted by what I 
identify as “racial blind spots” that are inconsonant with political reality.  
Given the role that courts play in enunciating these doctrines, their failure to 
meaningfully engage with the significance of white identity politics renders 
their governing frameworks and remedial prescriptions inapt.  The Article 
concludes by offering a number of suggestions, both doctrinal and 
legislative, for how to mitigate white identity politics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The role of race in American politics looms large in several election law 
doctrines.  In the racial gerrymandering doctrine, for example, a state acting 
“without sufficient justification”1 may not use race as the “predominant 
factor” when designing voting districts.2  The doctrine interpreting section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)3—the principal tool for the creation 
of majority-minority voting districts4—demands judicial inquiry into the 
political cohesion of plaintiff minority groups as well as the collective 
 
 1. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017). 
 2. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
 3. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012) (prohibiting states from applying any “standard, practice, 
or procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen 
of the United States to vote on account of race or color”). 
 4. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2:  Of Biased Votes, 
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 379 (2012) 
(“Enacted by Congress in 1982, the Section 2 ‘results test’ was the basis for a hugely 
successful litigation campaign against multimember districts and at-large elections, 
arrangements said to ‘dilute[] minority voting strength.’” (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 91 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment))). 
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tendencies of white voters.5  An additional and still unsettled section 2 
doctrine involving ballot access issues incorporates an inquiry into the racial 
motivations of state actors.6  Even doctrines that appear racially innocuous 
might be understood to have racial implications.7  As such, questions about 
the significance of race occupy center stage in many election law disputes.8 
Regrettably, though, these doctrines’ analyses of race, racial identity, and 
the relationships between race and politics often lack sophistication, 
historical context, or foresight.  In this Article, I explore the consequences of 
these deficiencies for both election law and American politics more broadly.  
The picture that emerges is alarming.  By and large, election law doctrines 
obfuscate the degree to which race has fractured our politics.  The result is a 
set of doctrines that set the terms of political engagement while ignoring 
political reality. 
 
 5. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48–51 (1986); BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., 
MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 49–51 (1992); see also 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn & Marisa A. Abrajano, Racially Polarized Voting, 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 589 (2016) (“Voting is polarized when (1) the political preferences of 
majority-race and minority-race voters diverge substantially and (2) the racial majority votes 
with enough cohesion to usually defeat the minority’s candidates of choice.”); D. James 
Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting:  Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the Melting Pot, 
86 IND. L.J. 447, 449 (2011) (“Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the concept 
of racial bloc voting to the law and theory in this area; for whatever the phrase means, it defines 
the dilution injury under widely disparate accounts of voting and democracy, justifies entry 
into the ‘racial thicket’ by a reluctant judiciary, and distinguishes official use of race in 
redistricting from official use of race in other settings.”). 
 6. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222–23 
(4th Cir. 2016) (“But intentionally targeting a particular race’s access to the franchise because 
its members vote for a particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory 
purpose.  This is so even absent any evidence of race-based hatred and despite the obvious 
political dynamics.  A state legislature acting on such a motivation engages in intentional racial 
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.”); see 
also Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare:  An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law, 
92 IND. L.J. 299, 313–17 (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 107–10; Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 
50 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 439, 451–55 (2015). 
 7. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Campaign Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
1523, 1529 (2001) (“There are serious reasons to resist the claim that black political 
participation can only be enhanced by campaign finance reform, given that black voters and 
candidates are greatly outspent and outmuscled in the struggle for campaign dollars.”); 
Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal:  Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 987, 987 (2002) (“Legal academics who call for campaign finance reform—let 
us call them ‘Reformers’—have overlooked the significance of race, and as a result their 
critiques of constitutional jurisprudence and reform proposals remain woefully incomplete.”). 
 8. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and Representation 
Revisited:  The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, 59 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1559, 1571 (2018) (“Racial classifications that are not tolerated in other domains, such 
as education and employment, are viewed as necessary in the context of race and voting.  
Moreover, they are not just viewed as necessary, sometimes they are even celebrated.”); see 
also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After 
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842 (2014) (arguing in response to others that “the voting rights 
regime must also provide robust protection against race discrimination specifically”). 
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Take the example of Chief Justice Roberts’s 5-4 majority opinion in Shelby 
County v. Holder,9 the case that invalidated section 4(b) of the Voting Rights 
Act.10  Invalidation of section 4(b) effectively also invalidated section 5, the 
so-called “preclearance” provision, which requires select state and local 
jurisdictions with a history of voting-related discrimination (“covered” 
jurisdictions) to get federal approval before making any voting-related 
changes.11 
In Shelby County, the Chief Justice characterized the preclearance regime 
as an anachronism, a remnant of a distant past.12  Narrowly focused on 
minority voting rates and the number of minority officeholders,13 he failed 
to thoroughly engage with the voluminous record evidence indicating that 
racial and ethnic minorities remain vulnerable to political suppression 
tactics.14  He provided only a perfunctory synopsis of the gross legacy of 
minority disenfranchisement in the South.15  And his claims regarding the 
preclearance regime’s deterrent effect were excessively assured, as was 
immediately evident.16 
 
 9. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 10. Id. at 557.  Section 4(b) was the provision used to identify which jurisdictions were 
subject to the Act’s “preclearance” regime under section 5. 
 11. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012). 
 12. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 535 (“There is no denying, however, that the conditions 
that originally justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered 
jurisdictions.”); see Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 329, 
330 (2013) (“Shelby County suggests that Congress may employ a remedy like preclearance 
only to reach the extreme Jim Crow variety, but not to address the more contained type of 
unconstitutional conduct we see today.  That is, it suggests that Congress may not select what 
it reasonably believes is the most effective way to remedy unconstitutional racial 
discrimination in voting when that discrimination falls short of the type that defined Alabama 
in 1965.”). 
 13. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 540. 
 14. See id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the 
Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 99 (2013) (summarizing the record 
evidence). 
 15. Chief Justice Roberts based his opinion in part on the “fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty,” the notion that states are equal in dignity and, accordingly, are to be treated 
equally. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544.  The preclearance regime, in the majority’s view, 
violated this principle.  A number of scholars have criticized the majority opinion for implying 
that the South has moved beyond its dark past.  See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers, Shelby County as 
a Sanction for States’ Rights in Elections, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 367, 372 (2015) 
(“More convincing, in my view, are arguments that the Shelby County decision represents a 
rejection of the principal ideational presumption of the civil rights era—namely, that absent 
federal oversight, state governments, and particularly state governments in the Deep South, 
cannot be trusted to equalize civil and voting rights for minorities.”); see also Joseph Fishkin, 
The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 179 (2013); Issacharoff, supra note 14, 
at 101.  Even former Justice John Paul Stevens felt compelled to criticize the majority 
opinion’s discussion of the South’s racist past in a “dissent” published in the New York Review 
of Books. John Paul Stevens, The Court & the Right to Vote:  A Dissent, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Aug. 15, 2013), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/08/15/the-court-right-to-vote-
dissent/ [https://perma.cc/8F6E-T7UX]. 
 16. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 550–51; Ellen D. Katz, The Shelby County Problem, in 
ELECTION LAW STORIES 505, 533 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016) 
(“Previously covered jurisdictions moved, some within hours of the decision, to impose 
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The Chief Justice’s Shelby County opinion, I argue, exemplifies a 
problematic feature of election law doctrines more broadly—namely, the 
near complete inattention to the role of white identity politics.  I define white 
identity politics as the creation of beliefs and alliances intended to advance 
the collective political interests of white voters.17  Collective political 
interests include policies that whites believe advantage them both materially 
and psychologically.18 
The doctrinal inattention to the role of white identity politics is what I 
identify as a “racial blind spot.”  This is the norm.  Further, in the scarce 
election law doctrines in which courts have arguably shown some cognizance 
of white identity politics, that cognizance has waned over time.19  In other 
words, white identity politics has been treated as a temporary concern rather 
than as an enduring feature of American politics. 
But again, racial blind spots are the norm.  For all of the relevance election 
law doctrines give to African American and Hispanic voting patterns, 
historical patterns of discrimination, and the disparate impact of government 
actions on minorities, the immense political significance of white identity is 
largely ignored.  This myopia renders the doctrines’ governing frameworks 
faulty and undermines our ability to comprehensively evaluate the doctrines’ 
democratic utility.  Put differently, the doctrines rely upon sanguine theories 
of democracy uncorrupted by white identity–based political calculations, 
while in fact such calculations, made on the part of both voters and political 
parties, are pervasive. 
In what follows, I appraise the doctrine pertaining to majority-minority 
voting districts, racial gerrymandering doctrine, the doctrine governing ballot 
access disputes, and campaign finance doctrine through the lens of white 
identity politics.  Drawing from research in political science, sociology, and 
history, I argue that the racial blind spots that blight these doctrines are 
inconsonant with political reality.  The doctrines’ formalism ignores, and 
thereby conceals, a distressing truth:  key segments of the modern Republican 
Party strategically foment and exploit white identity for political gain.20  
 
electoral restrictions that preclearance had, or would have, blocked.”); Sellers, supra note 15, 
at 381–83. 
 17. My definition of white identity politics relies on the work of the psychology professor 
Eric Knowles.  Somewhat surprisingly, the nuances of white identity have not been 
extensively studied in the social sciences.  This is largely explained by the longstanding belief 
among researchers that white identity is not salient to whites and therefore difficult to study.  
See generally Eric D. Knowles & Christopher K. Marshburn, Understanding White Identity 
Politics Will Be Crucial to Diversity Science, 21 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 134 (2010); Cara Wong 
& Grace E. Cho, Two-Headed Coins or Kandinskys:  White Racial Identification, 26 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 699 (2005); Eric D. Knowles & Linda R. Tropp, Donald Trump and the Rise of 
White Identity in Politics, CONVERSATION (Oct. 20, 2016), http://theconversation.com/donald-
trump-and-the-rise-of-white-identity-in-politics-67037 [https://perma.cc/SKP2-6CBC]. 
 18. Knowles & Marshburn, supra note 17, at 135–36. 
 19. Infra Part II.B. 
 20. One hesitates when casting aspersions on just one of the two major political parties, 
but the evidence in support of this claim is overwhelming.  There are certainly instances one 
could raise of the Democratic Party exploiting white identity, but the imbalance between the 
parties on this point is substantial.  Related partisan imbalances are well-documented.  See, 
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Much of the Republican electorate is motivated by white identity politics as 
well.  As put by Professor Ian Haney López:  “The rise of a racially-identified 
GOP is not a tale of latent bigotry in that party.  It is instead a story centered 
on the strategic decision . . . to become ‘the White Man’s Party.’”21  That 
strategic decision includes the conscious manipulation of electoral laws and 
structures. 
Consider again Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Shelby County, which 
provides a striking illustration of how white identity politics are concealed.  
As noted above, the opinion relied in part on the number of African American 
elected officials in the covered jurisdictions as a basis for finding section 4(b) 
of the VRA unconstitutional.22  Yet this statistic alone obscures the fact that 
those elected officials have been systematically impaired as part of a 
Republican Party strategy premised on reinforcing white identity politics.  
Take account of the following finding by the researcher David Bositis:  
“Following the 2011 elections, only 4.8 percent of black state legislators in 
the South serve in the majority, and 95.2 percent serve in the minority.”23  
Revealingly, as late as the mid-1990s the opposite was true—over 90 percent 
of black state legislators in the South served in the majority.24 
What caused this extraordinary reversal of fortune?  Simply put, 
Republican Party gamesmanship.  As summarized by Thomas Edsall in the 
New York Times: 
Where possible, Republican redistricting strategists have reduced the 
number of blacks in white Democratic legislative districts in order to render 
the incumbent vulnerable to Republican challenge.  In other areas of the 
state, where it has not been . . . possible to “bleach” a district, Republicans 
have sharply increased the percentage of blacks to over 50 percent in order 
to encourage a successful black challenge to the white Democratic 
incumbent.  In private discussions, Republicans in the South talk explicitly 
about their goal of turning the Democratic Party into a black party, and in 
many Southern states they have succeeded.25 
 
e.g., E. J. DIONNE JR. ET AL., ONE NATION AFTER TRUMP:  A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED, THE 
DISILLUSIONED, THE DESPERATE, AND THE NOT-YET DEPORTED 65–93 (2017); THOMAS E. 
MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:  HOW THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 51–58 (2012).  
See generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018). 
 21. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS:  HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE 
REINVENTED AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 18 (2014). 
 22. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 540, 547 (2013). 
 23. David A. Bositis, Research Brief:  Resegregation in Southern Politics?, JOINT CTR. 
FOR POL. & ECON. STUD., Nov. 2011, at 1, 2. 
 24. Id. (“[P]rior to the 1994 elections, 99.5 percent of black state legislators [in the South] 
served in the majority and after 1994, . . . 91.0 percent served in the majority.”). 
 25. Thomas B. Edsall, The Decline of Black Power in the South, N.Y. TIMES:  
OPINIONATOR (July 10, 2013, 9:34 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/ 
the-decline-of-black-power-in-the-south/ [https://perma.cc/982G-G8F7]. 
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Not all of the discussions are private.26  Perceived in this broader context, the 
increased number of African American elected officials in the covered 
jurisdictions—cited by the Chief Justice as compelling proof of racial 
equality—is not evidence of an absence of discrimination.  Instead, 
understood in context, it is evidence of the opposite:  a campaign to 
manipulate voting structures along racial lines. 
This Article joins an emerging body of scholarship asserting that American 
law and politics cannot be accurately understood today without 
understanding white identity politics.  Social scientists have offered a 
multitude of highly instructive findings.  One such finding, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, is that political identities are substantially intertwined with 
other social identities, including race and religion.  As summarized by the 
political scientists Lilliana Mason and Julie Wronski, “partisan identities, 
like their racial and religious counterparts, are social and visceral, and they 
work together with other social identities to drive political judgment.”27  For 
many white Americans, racial resentment also informs their political 
judgment. 
Moreover, the researchers Adam Enders and Jamil Scott found that 
although overall white racial resentment has remained steady for decades, its 
political significance has grown immensely.28  So, in short, partisan 
identity—which is itself intimately connected with racial identity29—
coupled with feelings of racial resentment, have been shown to affect white 
Americans’ political judgments.  The political scientist Michael Tesler offers 
the sobering observation that “racial attitudes are now more closely aligned 
with white Americans’ partisan preferences than they have been at any time 
in the history of polling.”30 
The partisan aspect cannot be overstated.  The Republican Party, long 
populated by whites,31 is now a predominantly white party: 
 
 26. Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty:  The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 573, 609–10 (2016) (citing a sworn affidavit from a South Carolina state 
representative endorsing the elimination of white Democrats). 
 27. Lilliana Mason & Julie Wronski, One Tribe to Bind Them All:  How Our Social Group 
Attachments Strengthen Partisanship, 39 ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 257, 259–60 (2018). 
 28. Adam M. Enders & Jamil S. Scott, White Racial Resentment Has Been Gaining 
Political Power for Decades, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/15/white-racial-resentment-has-been-gaining-political-
power-for-decades/ [https://perma.cc/9Z85-CH5R] (“By 2016, you could much more 
accurately predict . . . white voters’ attitude[s] toward almost everything we measured based 
on how racially resentful they might be than you could have in 1988.  These results suggest 
that white voters use their attitudes toward race to guide political decisions three times as much 
today as they did just 30 years ago.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Mason & Wronski, supra note 27, at 274 (“What we find is that Republican 
‘purity’ applies to in-party social homogeneity.  A Republican who does not fit the White, 
Christian mold is far less attached to the Republican Party than one who does fit the mold.”). 
 30. Michael Tesler, Views About Race Mattered More in Electing Trump Than in Electing 
Obama, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/11/22/peoples-views-about-race-mattered-more-in-electing-trump-than-in-
electing-obama/ [https://perma.cc/D4WX-FERM]. 
 31. See PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES:  RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA 
103 (1999) (“By late 1970, however, Nixon and the Republicans clearly believed that 
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Together with black enfranchisement, immigration has transformed 
American political parties.  These new voters have disproportionately 
supported the Democratic Party.  The non-white share of the Democratic 
vote rose from 7 percent in the 1950s to 44 percent in 2012.  Republican 
voters, by contrast, were still nearly 90 percent white into the 2000s.  So as 
the Democrats have increasingly become a party of ethnic minorities, the 
Republican Party has remained almost entirely a party of whites.32 
Political scientists Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal, in a comprehensive 
analysis of the issue, found that “[p]arty identification—the most influential 
variable in U.S. politics—is at least in part a function of the way individual 
white Americans view Latinos and undocumented immigrants.”33  The 
racialization of partisanship is similarly pronounced at the state level, where 
“among state-level elected Republican officials nationwide, 98 percent are 
white.”34 
This explanatory background is indispensable for two reasons.  First, it 
accentuates the empirically verified relationship that exists between white 
identity and political outcomes.  I mean to avoid grandiose theories of racism 
under which white Americans are inherently viewed with suspicion and the 
Republican Party is categorically denounced as irredeemably racist.35  And 
second, it rebuts any allegation that white identity politics is tangential to 
election law doctrines. 
Election law is, of course, inseparable from politics as practiced.36  
Accordingly, the arousal and activation of white identity politics by 
Republican Party leaders would seem to be of central significance to any 
judicious theory of contemporary American democracy.37  When 
 
appealing to blacks would hamper broader coalition-building efforts.”); see also THOMAS B. 
EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION:  THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON 
AMERICAN POLITICS 172 (1991). 
 32. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 171 (2018). 
 33. MARISA ABRAJANO & ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, WHITE BACKLASH, IMMIGRATION, RACE, 
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 85 (2015). 
 34. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 1. 
 35. Although I avoid such theories in this Article, it is worth noting that grandiose theories 
of racism often enjoy popular acclaim.  See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, The First White President:  
The Foundation of Donald Trump’s Presidency Is the Negation of Barack Obama’s Legacy, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-
white-president-ta-nehisi-coates/537909/ [https://perma.cc/6PHR-SHWX]. 
 36. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:  LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 2 (5th ed. 2016) (“Because democratic politics is not autonomous of 
existing law and institutions, those who control existing arrangements have the capacity to 
shape, manipulate, and distort democratic processes.”). 
 37. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 212 (“Conservatives cannot simply walk away from 
racial pandering, as they’ve been too successful in making race integral to modern 
conservatism.”); LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 32, at 9 (“The weakening of our democratic 
norms is rooted in extreme partisan polarization—one that extends beyond policy differences 
into an existential conflict over race and culture.  America’s efforts to achieve racial equality 
as our society grows increasingly diverse have fueled an insidious reaction and intensifying 
polarization.”); see also Mason & Wronski, supra note 27, at 274 (positing that “the 
Republican Party, being the less socially complex of the two parties, could relatively easily 
remind voters of their White and Christian identities to enhance partisan identity strength”); 
Paul M. Sniderman et al., The Politics of Race, in RACIALIZED POLITICS:  THE DEBATE ABOUT 
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establishing political ground rules—a defining objective of many election 
law doctrines—courts should be observant of what the likely impact of their 
mandates will be.38  Such speculation is already common among judges when 
deciding election law cases.  But such speculation is often flawed when white 
identity politics goes unacknowledged. 
My argument has much in kind with the work of Richard Pildes, who, more 
than anyone in the field, has considered the appropriate balance between 
institutional formalism and institutional realism.  He articulates the inquiry 
as one into “the systemic organization of political power and the ways that 
legal doctrines and frameworks, as well as institutional structures, determine 
the modes through which political power is effectively mobilized, organized, 
and encouraged or discouraged.”39  Pildes’s principal aspiration is the 
development of political structures that invigorate political competition.40  I 
build on his approach by stressing the extent to which white identity politics 
undermines the prospect of a well-functioning democracy.41 
It is important to note that race and racial analysis are conspicuous in 
election law doctrines.  White identity politics, however, is not.  The VRA 
doctrine pertaining to the creation of majority-minority voting districts, racial 
gerrymandering doctrine, and the doctrine encompassing both ballot access 
and what are known as “election administration” issues all address race, yet 
are inattentive to the significance of white identity politics. 
One might ask whether it is plausible that alternative election law doctrines 
would mitigate the pernicious effects of white identity politics, if in fact it is 
as entrenched as I have suggested.  This is a reasonable question to ask, and 
I cannot be certain of the answer.42  Politics is messy and unpredictable, and 
political identities are complex.  But these realities do not negate the value of 
 
RACISM IN AMERICA 236, 236 (2000) (“Citizens, it seems to us essential to recognize, get to 
choose only from among the choices on offer.  How they go about making choices on public 
policy hinges on how these choices are organized by political institutions and presented by 
public leaders.”); Enders & Scott, supra note 28 (“[P]olitical elites—politicians, party leaders, 
the political media and so on—have increasingly indulged in what scholars call ‘racial 
priming.’  Those are the subtle and not-so-subtle messages that encourage citizens to base 
their opinions at least in part on racial considerations.”). 
 38. Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the 
Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 806 (2014) (“This focus on the 
organization, structure, and exercise of actual political power in elections and in governance 
is what, in my view, characterizes ‘the law of democracy’—a systematic field of study in law 
schools for only the last twenty years or so.”). 
 39. Id.  For an earlier version of an approach in the same spirit, see KEITH J. BYBEE, 
MISTAKEN IDENTITY:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICS OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
170–72 (1998). 
 40. See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword:  The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29 (2004). 
 41. This is not to suggest that Pildes is not interested in or attuned to how race informs 
politics “on the ground.”  See, e.g., id. at 86–99 (discussing the institutional realism exhibited 
in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)). 
 42. A similar debate is underway about whether changes to campaign finance doctrine 
would lessen political polarization. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Playing Cards in a 
Hurricane:  Party Reform in an Age of Polarization, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 911 (2017). 
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critiquing the doctrines to the degree that their fundamental premises and 
analyses, given readily available evidence, are misguided. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I offers a brief sketch of white 
identity politics from the mid-twentieth century to the present.  Part II 
describes the myopia of several election law doctrines.  Part II.A describes 
the VRA doctrine pertaining to the creation of majority-minority voting 
districts, racial gerrymandering doctrine, portions of the doctrines regulating 
ballot access and election administration issues, and campaign finance 
doctrine, with an emphasis on how these doctrines presently attend to the 
nexus between race and politics.  These doctrines, I argue, exhibit myopia 
regarding the significance of white identity politics.  Part II.B describes two 
doctrines—the 1970s constitutional vote dilution doctrine and the political 
restructuring doctrine—that initially exhibited cognizance of white identity 
politics but which, over time, have been minimized to the point of 
irrelevance.  Part III then revisits the myopic doctrines, fully explicating their 
racial blind spots and how they, in some instances, threaten to intensify white 
identity politics.  Part IV contains suggestions, both doctrinal and legislative, 
for how to mitigate white identity politics. 
I.  WHITE IDENTITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
Race has defined the contours of American political history, and it 
continues to have a profound effect on electoral outcomes.  An accurate 
telling of the racialization of our politics is no less than a national 
indictment.43  In this Part, I offer a brief sketch of white identity politics from 
the mid-twentieth century to the present. 
A.  White Identity and Political Realignment 
Just after 6:00 p.m. on the evening of June 18, 1964, Arizona Senator and 
then–presidential contender Barry Goldwater (his nomination would follow 
in July) took the Senate floor.  His speech, “the most closely watched . . . of 
his political career,”44 exposed the fractured state of the Republican Party.  
Though Goldwater emphasized that he was “unalterably opposed to 
discrimination or segregation on the basis of race, color or creed, or any other 
basis,” he voiced his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.45  His 
objections, he asserted, were not based on racism, but on a principled 
 
 43. For classic statements to this effect see W. E. B. DuBois, Problem of 20th Century Is 
Problem of Color Line, PITT. COURIER, Jan. 14, 1950, at 8; Frederick Douglass, Speech, What 
to the Slave Is the Fourth of July? (July 5, 1852) (transcript available at 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/what-to-the-slave-is-the-fourth-of-july/ 
[https://perma.cc/X6ZF-X7B7]); and see also HOWARD ZINN, DECLARATIONS OF 
INDEPENDENCE:  CROSS-EXAMINING AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 231–58 (1990).  For a more modern 
critique, see generally DESMOND S. KING & ROGERS M. SMITH, STILL A HOUSE DIVIDED:  RACE 
AND POLITICS IN OBAMA’S AMERICA (2012). 
 44. RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM:  BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE UNMAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSENSUS 364 (2001). 
 45. Charles Mohr, Goldwater Says He’ll Vote ‘No’ on the Rights Measure, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 1964, at 1. 
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understanding of the Constitution.46  Goldwater’s position was not shared by 
the Republican Party establishment,47 which viewed African American 
voters, predominantly in the North, as an important electoral constituency.48 
Goldwater’s deviation from the emerging orthodoxy was viewed as 
politically foolish, yet even contemporaneous commenters observed the 
prospective benefits of what would come to be known as the “Southern 
strategy.”49  One columnist for the New York Times noted that Goldwater, “if 
nominated, may win votes from whites who are disgruntled over Negro 
militancy on civil rights.”50  Another reported the judgment that “the 
Republicans’ best chance of besting the Democrats in November is to ride 
the wave of sentiment in the South and North against the pace of Negro 
equality.”51  The influential writer and political reporter Walter Lippmann 
described Goldwater’s aim as the creation of “a white man’s party [that is] 
not conservative at all, but radically reactionary.”52  And the famed historian 
Richard Hofstadter wrote of how Goldwater and his supporters “committed 
themselves not merely to a drive for a core of Southern states in the Electoral 
College but to a strategic counterpart in the North which required the search 
for racist votes.”53 
That the Southern strategy was perceived to have any nationwide political 
traction demonstrates the discernable hostility many whites harbored against 
African American political advancement.  Such sentiments are unsurprising, 
given the completeness of the exclusionary regime African Americans 
 
 46. Id. (quoting Goldwater’s assertion that the Act’s public accommodations and fair 
employment provisions “fly in the face of the Constitution”).  Goldwater’s constitutional 
arguments were vetted and endorsed by future Chief Justice William Rehnquist and then-
Professor Robert Bork. PERLSTEIN, supra note 44, at 363. 
 47. James Reston, Deeper Split in GOP:  Goldwater Decision to Vote Against Civil Rights 
Bill Seems to Attack the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1964, at 18 (“Senator Barry Goldwater’s 
decision to vote against the civil rights bill has clearly widened the split in the Republican 
party and may very well have strengthened those who oppose his nomination as the 
Republican Presidential candidate.”). 
 48. See FRYMER, supra note 31, at 101 (“As recently as 1960, nearly a majority of middle-
class blacks and a third of all black voters had given their support to Richard Nixon against 
John Kennedy.  Although by 1964, fewer than a fifth of black voters supported Barry 
Goldwater, they continued to selectively offer support to Republican candidates at the state 
and local level.”). 
 49. See Walter Lippmann, The Goldwater Southern Strategy:  All-White GOP, STAN. 
DAILY, Oct. 8, 1964, at 6, https://stanforddailyarchive.com/cgi-bin/stanford?a=d&d= 
stanford19641008-01.2.41 [https://perma.cc/HU4G-FFSX] (“When Sen. Barry Goldwater 
went campaigning in the South, his purpose, it appears, was not so much to win this election, 
but to inaugurate the so[-]called southern strategy in order to lay the foundations for a radically 
new Republican Party.”). 
 50. Mohr, supra note 45, at 18. 
 51. Reston, supra note 47, at 18. 
 52. Lippmann, supra note 49, at 6. 
 53. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 99 (First Vintage 
Books ed. 2008).  Hofstadter arguably underestimated the strategy. See Rick Perlstein, I 
Thought I Understood the American Right.  Trump Proved Me Wrong., N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/magazine/i-thought-i-understood-the-
american-right-trump-proved-me-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/X7NG-M7WB] (suggesting 
that Hofstadter “didn’t take the self-identified conservatives of his own time at all seriously”). 
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confronted in the preceding decades.  African American men did enjoy a brief 
period of political inclusion following the ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.54  The promise of increased inclusion, though, proved 
illusory,55 and the South regressed into a racist aristocracy.56  When 
President Taft assumed the presidency in 1909, he disclaimed any 
responsibility for effectuating the Reconstruction Amendments.57  The U.S. 
Supreme Court was also an unreliable enforcer of African American political 
rights.58 
Suppression tactics were not limited to the South, and those sympathizing 
with white supremacist ideologies could be found at all levels of the social 
hierarchy.  As detailed in Linda Gordon’s recent study of the reemergence of 
the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, a number of such sympathizers held national 
political office.59  These historical truths provide important context for 
understanding why Goldwater and his aides saw opposition to civil rights 
measures as politically profitable. 
The overall effect of Goldwater’s nomination was far-reaching: 
In the national election of 1964, overwhelming numbers of African 
American voters cast their ballots in favor of the Democratic party 
candidate, Lyndon Johnson. . . .  Since that election, black voters have 
consistently supported Democratic candidates in presidential elections at 
rates of over 80 to 90 percent.  National Republican leaders, meanwhile, 
have made only sporadic and often halfhearted efforts to court black voters.  
 
 54. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE:  MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE 
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 18–20 (1999); RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO 
RECONSTRUCTIONS:  THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 99–109 (2004). 
 55. FRYMER, supra note 31, at 72 (“By the 1880s, with black Republican leaders 
marginalized and with fewer and fewer black voters participating in elections, national 
Republican leaders were able to further legitimate the pursuit of electoral strategies that largely 
excluded black interests.”); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:  
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 
139–81 (1974). 
 56. V. O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5 (5th prtg. 2001) (“In its 
grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro.  It is at times 
interpreted as a politics of cotton, as a politics of free trade, as a politics of agrarian poverty, 
or as a politics of planter and plutocrat.  Although such interpretations have a superficial 
validity, in the last analysis the major peculiarities of southern politics go back to the Negro.  
Whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the 
trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.”). 
 57. IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF:  THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 133 
(2013). 
 58. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
 59. LINDA GORDON, THE SECOND COMING OF THE KKK:  THE KU KLUX KLAN OF THE 
1920S AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 164 (2017) (“No one has been able to count 
all the Klan candidates elected to state and local offices, and the exercise would probably not 
be worthwhile in any case because so many non-members shared Klan ideology.  We can, 
however, note the members elected to high offices:  sixteen senators, scores of congressmen 
(the Klan claimed seventy-five), and eleven governors, pretty much equally divided between 
Democrats and Republicans.”). 
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Just as often, the party has utilized negative racial code words to appeal to 
swing voters and increase its base of primarily white voters.60 
Goldwater’s unsuccessful 1964 campaign is properly viewed as a precursor 
to President Richard Nixon’s full-scale embrace of the Southern strategy.  
While aspects of Nixon’s record have been cited as pro–civil rights—his 
support for the “Philadelphia Plan,” an affirmative action construction 
policy, for instance—even those actions have been interpreted as part of a 
larger effort to entice white voters.61 
What is apparent is that Nixon came to see racial pandering as his best path 
to victory.  Drawing lessons from the success of the outwardly racist 
presidential contender George Wallace, Nixon embraced the Republican 
Party’s sharp rightward shift on the issue of race.62  The shift was completed 
 
 60. FRYMER, supra note 31, at 87; see DOUG MCADAM & KARINA KLOOS, DEEPLY 
DIVIDED:  RACIAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN POSTWAR AMERICA 97 (2014) (“It now 
seems clear that Goldwater’s candidacy represents an important early source of centrifugal 
pressure that helps to set in motion the ideological makeover so evident in today’s Republican 
Party.”); see also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 21 (“The anti-New Deal Republican carried 
Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, states in which whites had 
never voted for a Republican president in more than miniscule numbers.  This was a shocking 
transformation, one that can only be explained by Goldwater’s ability to transmit a set of codes 
that white voters readily understood as a promise to protect racial segregation.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Chris Bonastia, Why Did Affirmative Action in Housing Fail During the 
Nixon Era?  Exploring the “Institutional Homes” of Social Policies, 47 SOC. PROBS. 523, 528 
(2000) (“The following year, the Nixon Administration revived the Philadelphia Plan for the 
integration of the construction trades.  Some scholars view this decision as a politically crafted 
strategy to divide two core Democratic constituencies, African-Americans and labor; indeed, 
top domestic policy aide John Ehrlichman highlights this political calculation as a major 
reason for Nixon’s support of the Philadelphia Plan.” (citations omitted)); Thomas J. Sugrue, 
Affirmative Action from Below:  Civil Rights, the Building Trades, and the Politics of Racial 
Equality in the Urban North, 1945–1969, 91 J. AM. HIST. 145, 172 (2004) (“Many Nixon aides 
also saw electoral benefits to the [Philadelphia] plan:  it would mortally wound the New Deal 
coalition by dividing working-class whites and blacks—a division that had been foreshadowed 
in the acrimonious construction site protests.”). 
 62. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE:  RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
POLITICS 106 (1994) (“The Nixon administration and its Southern strategy, combined with the 
defection of large numbers of supporters of racist Alabama governor George Wallace to the 
Republican party . . . helped seal the racial cleavage within the American party system.”); 
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 31, at 98 (“Race was central, Nixon and key Republican 
strategists began to recognize, to the fundamental conservative strategy of establishing a new, 
non-economic polarization of the electorate, a polarization isolating a liberal, activist, 
culturally-permissive, rights-oriented, and pro-black Democratic Party against those unwilling 
to pay the financial and social costs of this reconfigured social order.”); FRYMER, supra note 
31, at 103 (“By late 1970, however, Nixon and the Republicans clearly believed that appealing 
to blacks would hamper broader coalition-building efforts.”); LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra 
note 32, at 36 (“Wallace’s message, which mixed racism with populist appeals to working-
class whites’ sense of victimhood and economic anger, helped him make inroads into the 
Democrats’ traditional blue-collar base.”); MCADAM & KLOOS, supra note 60, at 112–13 
(“The significance of the Wallace candidacy and the broader white resistance movement he 
represented for the future electoral prospects of both parties was clear on the face of the 1968 
election returns.  With the two major parties evenly dividing 86 percent of the popular vote, 
the remaining 14 percent, which had gone for Wallace, clearly loomed as the balance of power 
in future elections.”); RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND:  THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE 
FRACTURING OF AMERICA 464–68 (describing Nixon’s Southern strategy and attempts to derail 
Wallace); Frank Rich, After Trump, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 13, 2017), http://nymag.com/ 
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under President Reagan, who routinely pandered to the concerns of white 
voters.63  The resulting political realignment was sweeping.  As noted by 
Thomas and Mary Edsall: 
In 1984, the precincts in white, working-class neighborhoods in the urban 
North joined the South in propelling a presidential realignment, as the 
eroding Democratic loyalty of these voters transformed itself from 
ambivalence to outright rejection.  The 1984 election demonstrated that the 
policy agenda developed by the Reagan administration once in office—an 
agenda designed to sustain the racial and economic polarization that had 
emerged in force in the 1980 election—had worked to nurture and enlarge 
the Republican presidential voting base established in 1980.64 
The Democratic Party, to the chagrin of party officials, was seen as the party 
for minorities.65 
The party’s image persists through the present.  Despite calculated 
attempts by President Bill Clinton to attract white voters and reintegrate them 
into the Democratic Party,66 the reliance of the party on minority voters and, 
accordingly, its commitment to serving their interests, repels a significant 
portion of the white electorate.  The election of President Barack Obama 
 
daily/intelligencer/2017/11/frank-rich-trumpism-after-trump.html [https://perma.cc/XCF5-
D3PU] (“Both in 1968 and 1972, with the race-baiting Spiro Agnew on the ticket, Nixon 
worked hard to usher Wallace’s disaffected white Democrats into the GOP en masse by 
pandering to their racial and cultural resentments with respectable code words (‘silent 
majority,’ ‘law and order’) rather than rants like Wallace’s clarion call for ‘segregation 
forever.’”). 
 63. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 56 (“In the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan would 
come out firing on racial issues, and would blast past Carter.  Just 36 percent of whites, only 
slightly better than one in three, voted for Carter in 1980.”); LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 
32, at 169 (“The racial appeals of Nixon’s ‘Southern Strategy’ and, later on, Ronald Reagan’s 
coded messages about race communicated to voters that the GOP was the home for white 
racial conservatives.”); MCADAM & KLOOS, supra note 60, at 190 (“But it was Reagan, 
through his words and his record, far more than the two platforms, who spoke most directly 
and effectively to the white South in 1980.  He proved to be a master of speaking in code about 
racial matters of long-standing concern to the white South.  At campaign stops in the region 
he reassured voters that he had long opposed government ‘interference’ in ‘states’ rights,’ 
reminding them that he had refused to back either the Civil Rights Act in 1964 or the Voting 
Rights Act in 1965.”); see also DAWSON, supra note 62, at 97 (“In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan 
led the Republican party to a series of victories that reversed long-standing economic and 
racial policies.  The great majority of African Americans believe Reagan’s policy reversals 
represented a severe blow to African-American racial interests.”). 
 64. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 31, at 172; see Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 
2012 Term—Foreword:  Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32–34 (2013). 
 65. FRYMER, supra note 31, at 112 (referring to a speech in the wake of the 1984 election 
in which “Senator Daniel Moynihan claimed that the party was now seen by national voters 
as primarily one for minority voters”). 
 66. BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 395 (“I spoke . . . [to] Reagan Democrats . . . voters [who] 
had begun voting Republican in the 1960s, because they thought the Democrats no longer 
shared their values of work and family, and were too concerned with social programs, which 
they tended to see as taking their tax money and giving it to blacks and wasteful bureaucrats.  
I told a full house [of these voters] that I would give them a new Democratic Party . . . .”); 
FRYMER, supra note 31, at 4–6 (describing examples of Clinton’s efforts to appeal to 
disaffected white voters, such as calling for welfare reform and explicitly “distanc[ing] himself 
from representatives of the party’s African American constituency”). 
2019] ELECTION LAW AND WHITE IDENTITY POLITICS 1529 
further exacerbated many whites’ racial anxieties.  In their study of the rise 
of the Tea Party movement—a nearly all-white movement—political 
scientists Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson found that hatred of 
Obama explained many members’ participation.67  In 2012: 
Romney won the votes of three out of every five white voters; won among 
white men, white women, and white youth; and won a majority of the white 
vote in every state in the union save four.  Only two candidates have done 
notably better among whites since dog whistling began:  Richard Nixon in 
his 1972 landslide and Ronald Reagan in his 1984 re-election.68 
White identity politics, then, is a uniquely important variable in 
understanding the nation’s most recent political realignment. 
B.  Trump and White Identity Politics 
Writing in 2013, the historian and urban theorist Mike Davis questioned 
whether the modern Republican Party could alter its agenda “to encompass 
the minimal share of American ethnic and racial diversity that henceforth will 
be required to occupy the White House.”69  The “Southernization” of the 
party, as he called it, was “beginning to terrify many Old School 
Republicans.”70  The fear Davis described had long troubled Party leaders.  
Ed Gillespie, while chairman of the Republican National Committee, 
authored an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal admonishing Party members 
about the electoral consequences of the party’s anti-immigrant disposition.71 
Former Republican congressman Mick Mulvaney72 sounded a similar note 
in speaking to his South Carolina constituents in 2015: 
 
 67. Erin O’Donnell, Tea Party Passions, HARV. MAG. (Jan.–Feb. 2012), 
https://harvardmagazine.com/2012/01/tea-party-passions [https://perma.cc/5LMT-VPRE]; 
see also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 152 (“The vast majority of those identifying with the 
Tea Party were not dyed-in-the-wool Goldwaterites and last-gasp Birchers.  They were 
Wallace voters and Reagan Democrats.  They were persons stampeded by racial anxieties into 
fearing government and demonizing liberalism.”). 
 68. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 166. 
 69. Mike Davis, The Last White Election?, 79 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 11 (2013). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Edward Gillespie, Opinion, Populists Beware!  The GOP Must Not Become an Anti-
Immigration Party, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/2006 
1111031332/http:/www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008173 
[https://perma.cc/2T58-P7QK] (“The Republican Party cannot become an anti-immigration 
party.  Our majority already rests too heavily on white voters, given that current demographic 
voting percentages will not allow us to hold our majority in the future.”). 
 72. As of this writing, Mulvaney is currently President Trump’s Acting Chief of Staff and 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Michael Tackett & Maggie Haberman, 
Trump Names Mick Mulvaney Acting Chief of Staff, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/us/politics/mick-mulvaney-trump-chief-of-staff.html 
[https://perma.cc/QQE8-YLNA].  He also served as the Acting Director of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau in the Trump administration. See Glenn Thrush & Alan 
Rappaport, ‘Like a Mosquito in a Nudist Colony’:  How Mick Mulvaney Found Plenty to 
Target at Consumer Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/05/07/us/mick-mulvaney-budget-director-consumer-bureau.html [https://perma.cc/8F 
N9-XGVN]. 
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At some point we’re going to have to figure out that if you take the entire 
African American community and write them off.  Take the entire Hispanic 
community and write them off.  Take the entire Libertarian community and 
write them off.  Take the entire gay community and write them off.  What’s 
left?  About 38 percent of the country.  You cannot win with 38 percent of 
the country.  We need to stop celebrating the absurd in our party.  And stop 
rewarding the outrageous and the stupid.  We have to figure out how to deal 
with it as a party.  We’re losing too many elections; we’re writing off too 
many people.  Umm, I’ll give you one last number.  Mitt Romney won 
Texas by 900,000 votes.  Pretty good.  There are three million Hispanic 
people in Texas who will be able to register to vote before the next election, 
2016, three million new Hispanic voters who are not eligible to vote in 2012 
but will be eligible to vote in 2016.  If the next Republican candidate for 
President gets the same percentage of the Hispanic vote that Mitt Romney 
got, we will lose Texas.  Not in 2024, not in 2020, but in 2016.  And if we 
lose Texas folks, I’ve got news for you, we’re never gonna elect a 
Republican president again.73 
However sincere the consternation of Gillespie and Mulvaney, the election 
and continued support of President Donald Trump signifies acceptance on 
the part of much of the Republican Party establishment and base of an 
aggressively racist and anti-immigrant agenda.  Relevant here are actions 
Trump has taken and statements he has made that intensify white identity 
politics.74 
Trump, as is well known, was a prominent skeptic of President Obama’s 
citizenship, and he used the so-called “birther” issue to build momentum for 
his campaign.75  Those susceptible to the birther conspiracy, as shown by 
political scientist Philip Klinkner, were both white and Republican.76  Trump 
notoriously announced his campaign with a speech in which he referred to 
Mexican immigrants as “rapists,”77 and he has fomented xenophobia in 
defense of his immigration-related actions, including the issuance of an 
executive order barring entry to those from predominantly Muslim 
countries.78  Such actions are more than just theater.  Studies confirm that 
 
 73. Frontline PBS, Rep. Mick Mulvaney Chastises Fellow Republicans on Immigration, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6T5lMHNcPUI 
[https://perma.cc/E96H-SNYY] (statement at timestamp 2:17). 
 74. These actions and statements are of a piece with a broader threat to the Republic that 
Trump presents. See generally Jamal Greene, Trump as Constitutional Failure, 93 IND. L.J. 
93 (2018); Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-Term Perspective, 117 MICH. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1 (2018). 
 75. See Michael D. Shear, With Document, Obama Seeks to End ‘Birther’ Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/us/politics/28obama.html 
[https://perma.cc/68AS-BGHW]. 
 76. Philip Klinkner, The Causes and Consequences of “Birtherism” (2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 77. See Alexander Burns, Choice Words from Donald Trump, Presidential Candidate, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015, 2:01 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/ 
2015/06/16/choice-words-from-donald-trump-presidential-candidate/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6MVK-Q7QT]. 
 78. See generally Brief of the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 
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“residents of a diminishing number of decisively white American towns and 
small cities—even those which supported Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012—
can now be politically mobilized around race, ethnicity, multiculturalism and 
immigration.”79 
Trump has disparaged Africans,80 selectively castigated African American 
football players for protesting racial injustice,81 and defended white 
nationalist marchers.82  He provocatively nominated Alabama Senator Jeff 
Sessions to be Attorney General, despite compelling allegations of racism in 
his past.83  He has granted executive office space to avowed white 
nationalists84 and praised and endorsed slavery apologists.85 
 
(2017) (Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540); Nicholas Kulish, Caitlin Dickerson & Charlie Savage, Court 
Temporarily Blocks Trump’s Travel Ban, and Airlines Are Told to Allow Passengers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/us/visa-ban-legal-challenge.html 
[https://perma.cc/XM4W-FBJW]. 
 79. Thomas B. Edsall, White-on-White Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), 
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XXJ6-FF54]. 
 80. See, e.g., Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ 
Countries, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
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sessions-previously-denied-federal-judgeship-amid-racism-controversy [https://perma.cc/VE 
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Collectively, these actions and statements communicate a sympathy for 
white Americans who are disconcerted by “a growing sense of racial or 
global threat.”86  The political scientists John Sides, Michael Tesler, and 
Lynn Vavreck, based on their research, have concluded that “white identity 
mattered a great deal for voter behavior in the 2016 election, and this appears 
tied to Donald Trump’s candidacy in particular.”87  To offer a final example, 
at the height of the debate over the Trump administration’s decision to divide 
undocumented immigrant children from their parents, Trump’s approval 
rating among Republicans was at 90 percent.88  In sum, white identity politics 
is more than just an aberrational feature of partisan politics; it is a recurrent, 
durable driver of political outcomes.89  Yet despite its undoubted importance, 
the realities of white identity politics carry little weight in election law 
doctrines. 
II.  RACE AND POLITICS IN ELECTION LAW 
Given the significance of white identity politics in late twentieth-century 
and early twenty-first-century American politics, one might expect that 
election law doctrines, observant as they are of political realities, might 
routinely engage the issue.  Such consideration, however, is glaringly absent.  
This Part details what I identify as “racial blind spots” in several election law 
doctrines.  It then considers two doctrines that initially exhibited cognizance 
of white identity politics but that, over time, have been minimized to the point 
of irrelevance. 
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A.  Myopia 
This section describes several election law doctrines that can be 
categorized as myopic on the issue of white identity politics.  These doctrines 
—the VRA doctrine pertaining to the creation of majority-minority voting 
districts, racial gerrymandering doctrine, the doctrine encompassing ballot 
access and election administration issues, and campaign finance doctrine—
fail to engage with the significance of white identity politics.  Though the 
first three doctrines expressly address race, they do not address white identity 
politics. 
1.  The Voting Rights Act and Majority-Minority Districts 
The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 1963 “I Have a Dream” speech, 
delivered from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, stands as canonical 
American oratory.  Few listeners know, however, that King improvised the 
“dream” portion.  He had used the same peroration in earlier speeches, but it 
was not part of what he had planned for that afternoon.90  King’s 
improvisation, undetectable to the listener, reveals his skill at adaptation.  
Whether the nation itself was prepared to adapt was a different matter. 
The particular setting would have been familiar to him.  Six years earlier, 
King had led a “Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom” to Washington, D.C., during 
which he delivered a speech from the same location.91  In that speech, King 
implored the federal government to act to protect African American voting 
rights.92  As he knew, and as history revealed, without the vote, African 
American political advancement was an impossibility. 
For decades, the southern-dominated Democratic Party limited 
participation in primary elections, which were often dispositive, to white 
voters.  It was not until 1944 that the Supreme Court declared such exclusion 
unconstitutional.93  Poll tax laws, upheld by the Court in 1937,94 suppressed 
both African American and white votes95 until they were finally invalidated 
in the mid-1960s.96  Literacy tests were a particular source of evil, arbitrarily 
 
 90. DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE 
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 283 (1986). 
 91. Jay Walz, Negroes Hold Rally on Rights in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1957, at 1. 
 92. See GARROW, supra note 90, at 93; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE 
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 206–07 (rev. ed. 2009). 
 93. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649. 661–66 (1944). 
 94. See generally Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
 95. See KEYSSAR, supra note 92, at 189–90. 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (invalidating federal poll taxes); Harper v. Va. Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state poll taxes); Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer 
Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution:  The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 63, 66 (2009) (“[B]etween 1962 and 1966 a cascading wave [of legislative and legal 
victories] swept away the poll tax once and for all . . . .”). 
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used to turn African Americans away from the polls.97  They were upheld by 
the Court as late as 195998 and were not categorically eliminated until 1970.99 
The comprehensiveness of the exclusionary regime convinced reformers 
that federal action was imperative.100  The foundational aspiration of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 was, then, to integrate African Americans into 
mainstream politics by way of the vote; to remedy African Americans’ 
political eviction through extension of the franchise.  To that end, the Act 
was remarkably successful.  African American voter registration rates 
markedly rose,101 and in time, African American candidates found electoral 
success.102 
The Act itself was instrumental in the achievement of this success.  Section 
5, introduced above, targeted jurisdictions with a demonstrated history of 
“unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution”103 by prohibiting 
any voting-related changes that made minorities worse off.104  Section 2 of 
the Act, unlike section 5, is geographically unrestricted and places the 
primary evidentiary burden on plaintiffs.  It forbids any “standard, practice, 
or procedure . . . which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”105  Taken in 
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CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING:  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 21 
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). 
 102. KATHERINE TATE, BLACK FACES IN THE MIRROR:  AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THEIR 
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 55 (2003). 
 103. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
 104. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (“In other words the purpose of § 5 
has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to 
a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of 
the electoral franchise.”). 
 105. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).  For the history of section 2 and its evolution from a rarely 
used provision to the central VRA litigation tool, see generally Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen 
J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act:  A Legislative History, 40 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (2008); Heather K. 
Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001). 
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combination, these provisions comprised the core of the VRA and codified a 
unique statutory remedy for the democratic marginalization of voters of 
color.106 
By no means, however, was enforcement of the Act uncontested.  The 
VRA’s protection of “the right to vote” invited interpretive disputes over 
what that phrase encompasses.  More precisely, the mere ability to cast a vote 
does not ensure that one’s vote holds meaning if a meaningful vote is defined 
as one with the potential to influence electoral outcomes.  There are myriad 
ways in which electoral structures may be designed so as to dilute the votes 
of minority voters (whether racial, ethnic, or numeric).107 
Jurisdictions opposed to the VRA’s directives implemented a wide variety 
of institutional changes antithetical to the Act’s purpose.108  In response, and 
across years of litigation, the Court interpreted the VRA’s protections to 
prohibit a multitude of such schemes, including the replacement of district-
based election systems (under which minorities can plausibly achieve 
electoral success) with at-large election systems,109 strategic polling place 
adjustments,110 and redistricting plans designed to minimize minority voting 
influence.111  The most impactful judicial remedy for these dilutive schemes 
was the creation of single-member, majority-minority voting districts.112 
Aside from its extension of the franchise, the legally mandated creation of 
majority-minority districts is the principal legacy of the VRA.  In fact, a large 
number of the minority members of Congress owe their election to the 
 
 106. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter:  
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 107. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution:  An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE 
DILUTION 1, 5–9 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (describing dilutionary mechanisms). 
 108. Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:  The Role of Geographic Compactness in 
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 173, 184 (1989) (“Starting in 
1966, in the wake of the massive influx of black voters brought about by the Act’s registration 
machinery, jurisdiction after jurisdiction adopted measures designed to minimize the impact 
of the increased black vote.”). 
 109. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969). 
 110. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971). 
 111. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534–35 (1973). 
 112. Many of these districts were initially created after the 1990 U.S. Census. DAVID 
LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION 6 (1997) (“The Voting Rights Act did not strictly 
require the creation of new black districts, but court decisions combined with the provisions 
of the act forced states to draw new majority-minority districts or face opposition to their 
redistricting plans from the Justice Department and the courts.”); see also Adam B. Cox & 
Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
553, 576–77 (2011). 
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creation of such districts.113  The use of majority-minority districts as a 
remedy for minority vote dilution—a direct outgrowth of Justice William 
Brennan’s framework-establishing opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles114—
reflects what might be designated the consensus approach to minority 
political empowerment, which was embraced by both political parties and all 
three branches of the federal government.  Under the consensus approach, 
the principal metric for assessing VRA success is the election of minority 
candidates.  The cause and effect of that consensus warrants a detailed 
explanation. 
The foundation of the consensus is Gingles.  The case arose following the 
North Carolina General Assembly’s enactment of a state legislative 
districting plan that, through its use of multimember electoral districts, was 
alleged to dilute minority votes in violation of section 2 of the VRA.  This 
arrangement prevented minority voters from electing their preferred 
candidates.115  Dilution claims, it should be noted, are premised on the 
enduring fact that African American, Hispanic, and white voters generally 
favor different candidates.  Consequently, the use of at-large or multimember 
electoral districts is a reliable means of preventing minority voters from 
electing candidates of choice.  Put differently, absent some degree of racial 
crossover voting, minority voters are unlikely to see their preferred 
candidates in office.116 
Faced with this conundrum in Gingles, Justice Brennan endeavored to 
condense earlier vote dilution precedents and the VRA’s legislative history 
into a workable framework.117  A successful claim, he explained, depends 
upon both the need and the possibility of minority electoral success.  That is, 
“a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported 
by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group.”118 
These three prerequisites—(1) geographic compactness and a population 
sufficient to comprise the majority in a single-member district; (2) political 
cohesion; and (3) the existence of racially polarized voting—form “the 
linchpin of the [section 2] liability inquiry.”119  While earlier cases, the text 
 
 113. See FRYMER, supra note 31, at 174; LUBLIN, supra note 112, at 6–7, 22; KENNY J. 
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RIGHTS ACT:  1965–1990, supra note 100, at 335, 339–40 (“Action by the Justice Department, 
as well as by private litigants (particularly in the 1980s, when civil rights and minority groups 
made use of the newly amended provisions of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act), accounts 
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 114. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 115. Id. at 34–35. 
 116. Karlan, supra note 108, at 177. 
 117. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35, 48; see also GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 31–42. 
 118. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48–49. 
 119. Cox & Miles, supra note 105, at 1501; see Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and 
the Political Process:  The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1833, 1849 (1992) (“When stripped to its essentials, the paradigmatic claim of minority vote 
dilution . . . incorporate[s] three basic features:  (1) structural obstacles to the electoral success 
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of section 2, and the VRA’s legislative history also advise consideration of 
the “totality of the circumstances”—which includes the history of official 
discrimination in a given jurisdiction and the past and present use of racial 
appeals in campaigns120—satisfaction of the three prerequisites generally 
determines liability.121 
In Gingles itself, the Court invalidated the challenged districts,122 finding 
the African American community to be of sufficient size,123 and finding 
racially polarized voting—the most important evidentiary component—to be 
extant.124  The upshot of the decision was the introduction of a relatively 
simple framework for adjudicating vote dilution claims.  Lower courts, the 
executive branch, political parties, and the voting rights bar followed the 
Court’s lead, thereby establishing the consensus.  As summarized by 
Professor J. Morgan Kousser, “Seemingly uncomplicated, this ‘three-
pronged Gingles test’ became the fulcrum of voting rights cases for the rest 
of the decade and strongly influenced the 1990s round of redistricting, being 
interpreted by people of nearly all political persuasions as mandating the 
drawing of minority opportunity districts wherever possible.”125 
In addition, though, what the decision enunciated, and what was 
augmented in the profusion of subsequent cases,126 was what Professor Lani 
 
of minorities, such as at-large elections; (2) behavioral patterns that interact with the structural 
obstacles to exaggerate the political power of the majority—i.e., racially polarized voting; and 
(3) a resulting underrepresentation or even complete lack of representation of the minority 
community relative to its proportion of the population.”). 
 120. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297, 1305–
07 (5th Cir. 1973).  See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982). 
 121. Cox & Miles, supra note 105, at 1519–20 (providing data in support of the 
“conventional wisdom that satisfaction of the Gingles factors correlates strongly with 
liability”). 
 122. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80 (“The District Court in this case carefully considered the 
totality of the circumstances and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy 
of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health 
services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with the 
multimember districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically 
cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect 
candidates of their choice.”).  Justice Byron White, in concurrence, objected to Justice William 
Brennan’s statement that when assessing racially polarized voting the race of the candidate is 
irrelevant. Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring).  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor rejected Justice 
Brennan’s three-part vote dilution framework on the grounds that it would effectively require 
proportional representation, despite Congress’s express desire to the contrary. Id. at 96 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 123. Id. at 50 n.16 (majority opinion). 
 124. Id. at 56 (“The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting is 
twofold:  to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit 
and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidates.”); see also Issacharoff, supra note 119, at 1851 (“Gingles brought the 
racially polarized voting inquiry into the undisputed and unchallenged center of the Voting 
Rights Act . . . .”). 
 125. KOUSSER, supra note 54, at 343. 
 126. See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting:  Judicial Findings 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 660 (2006) 
(“Since the Court decided Gingles, 169 lawsuits have addressed its preconditions, and 68 
lawsuits found them to be satisfied.”). 
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Guinier famously called the “triumph of tokenism.”127  Guinier presciently 
deciphered the disadvantages of the doctrine’s prioritization of electoral 
success at the expense of other correctives.128  When the “ability to elect” 
became the preeminent aspiration, alternate ideas about how to effectuate 
minority political empowerment were marginalized.  Put differently, the 
consensus created an ideational inflection point that narrowly demarcated the 
realm of the possible.129 
The deficiencies of the consensus were immediately apparent in the lower 
courts.  For instance, in Florida, African American plaintiffs challenged the 
use of an at-large district system for the election of county commissioners 
and county school board members.130  County officials conceded a VRA 
violation and agreed to replace the at-large system with a system of single-
 
 127. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:  FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 41 (1994). 
 128. See id. at 49 (“Litigation to enforce the Voting Rights Act transformed the original 
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legislation work at cross-purposes.”); MICHAEL D. MINTA, OVERSIGHT:  REPRESENTING THE 
INTERESTS OF BLACKS AND LATINOS IN CONGRESS 125 (2011) (highlighting “the important role 
that racial and ethnic minorities play in improving the policymaking process through strategic 
group uplift and by bringing distinctive perspectives to policymaking and congressional 
oversight”); ADOLPH REED, JR., STIRRINGS IN THE JUG:  BLACK POLITICS IN THE POST-
SEGREGATION ERA 121 (1999) (“The new regime of race relations management as realized 
through the four-pronged dynamic of incorporation that I have discussed has exerted a 
demobilizing effect on black politics precisely by virtue of its capacities for delivering benefits 
and, perhaps more important, for defining what benefits political action can legitimately be 
used to pursue.”); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS:  THE REPRESENTATION 
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 19 (enlarged ed. 2006) (“[W]hite Democrats also appear 
to represent blacks well.”); MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY:  
MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION 223 (1998) (“[O]ne 
hope is that the mere presence of representatives from historically marginalized groups will 
produce changes in legislative dynamics.”); Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn 
O’Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in 
Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 798 (1996) (“The overall efficacy of majority-minority 
districts in advancing black interests, therefore, remains unresolved.  These districts certainly 
increase the number of minority candidates elected to office, that is, the descriptive 
representation of minorities.  But it is unclear that concentrated minority districts augment the 
substantive representation of minorities or the chance that legislation favored by the minority 
community will be enacted by Congress.”). 
 130. See Potter v. Washington County, 653 F. Supp. 121, 122 (N.D. Fla. 1996). 
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member districts.131  Plaintiffs sought the creation of a majority-minority 
district as a remedy, but the district court judge found that “there is no 
provision in the Voting Rights Act that minorities must be afforded 
proportionate representation on a legislative body.”132  This finding 
concluded the case; alternative means of affording plaintiffs an effective 
voice in the community were not considered. 
The preeminence of the consensus was similarly evident in a challenge 
brought by African American voters to an at-large aldermanic election 
system in Mississippi.133  The facts of the case were unusual in that African 
Americans constituted over 60 percent of the jurisdiction’s voting-age 
population, yet they had largely failed to elect any of their preferred 
candidates to the four-member board of aldermen.134  Given the 
demographics, and no doubt assured by the belief that the prospect of 
electoral success was self-evident, the city officials conceded liability under 
the VRA:  “The city nonetheless contends that, even though arguendo it 
deprives blacks of their right to participate equally in the political process, 
the substantial black majority of [the city’s] voting-age population prevents 
the district court from ordering relief under the Act.”135  This audacious 
concession is unintelligible without an understanding of how narrow the 
VRA’s remedial breadth was perceived to be.136 
The consensus also enabled political opportunism.  As has been well-
documented, one of the great ironies of the consensus was the opportunity it 
presented to the Republican Party.  The party perceived an advantage in 
creating majority-minority districts; in “packing” minority voters—who by 
this point reliably voted for Democrats—into a limited number of districts, 
thereby strengthening the party’s electoral prospects elsewhere.  The political 
calculation was succinctly captured by the political scientists Edward 
Carmines and Robert Huckfeldt, who, writing in 1992, concluded that “[t]he 
coalition of blacks and new white liberals that is often able to win elections 
in local politics is doomed to failure in national politics because there are not 
enough white liberals.”137  Once the Republican Party apprehended the 
advantage to be gained by packing, it fully embraced the consensus and 
advocated the use of both section 5 and section 2 to mandate the creation of 
majority-minority districts wherever possible.138 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. at 127. 
 133. See Monroe v. City of Woodville, 819 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 134. See id. at 508. 
 135. Id. at 510. 
 136. Though not to the judge deciding the case. See id. at 510 (“We find the city’s 
concession of a violation of the Voting Rights Act to be both logically and factually 
inconsistent with its stance that [the city] is already a safe district.”). 
 137. Edward G. Carmines & Robert Huckfeldt, Party Politics in the Wake of the Voting 
Rights Act, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING:  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 101, at 117, 134. 
 138. KOUSSER, supra note 54, at 409 (noting that the Republican Party “propos[ed] to pack 
minorities into as few seats as possible and to turn white and minority Democrats against each 
other by making gains for one group come at the expense of the other”); LUBLIN, supra note 
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In retrospect, the VRA might have helped curtail the growth of white 
identity politics.  This is perhaps wishful thinking, but it is at least plausible 
that use of the VRA to combat concerted efforts to “abridge” the right to vote 
might have stemmed some of the worst occurrences.  Alternatively, there 
might have been greater creativity on the part of judges during the remedial 
stage of litigation.  Instead, white identity politics took firm hold during the 
Reagan years and have informed Republican Party politics ever since. 
This section might be summarized as follows:  in recent decades, the 
judiciary has expressed a clear commitment to the diversification of 
legislative bodies.  This commitment, arguably coming at the expense of 
alternative, more capacious means of effectuating minority political 
empowerment, has been instrumental in helping minorities obtain elected 
office.  In furtherance of this aspiration, courts have adopted a pluralist theory 
of democracy, which regards minorities as specialized interest groups that 
warrant judicial solicitude, yet ultimately bear the obligation to advance their 
interests through traditional democratic channels.139  This approach was 
conducive to integrating minorities into mainstream politics, but it was 
inherently limited in scope and consequently failed to respond to the 
institutionalization of white identity politics by the Republican Party. 
In addition to enabling political opportunism, the consensus obstructed 
from view the ways in which white identity politics was operating in the 
electorate.  For instance, Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel 
Persily identify a sizable racial divide in public opinion on the merits of 
majority-minority districting:  “Clear racial differences can be seen 
concerning approval of [majority-minority districts]:  83% of Blacks and 
74% of Hispanics, but only 44% of Whites, approve of the creation of 
[majority-minority districts].”140  Though any definite conclusions would be 
premature, the findings raise the question of whether majority-minority 
districts inspire racial resentment among whites. 
 
112, at 30 (“Thornburg v. Gingles paved the way for minorities, the Department of Justice, 
and Republicans to successfully press state legislators to create new majority-minority 
constituencies during the 1990 redistricting cycle with the full force of the Voting Rights Act 
behind them.”); Cox & Holden, supra note 112, at 586–87 (describing the Republican Party’s 
“max black” agenda). 
 139. See generally DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:  POLITICAL INTERESTS 
AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951) (discussing pluralism and the role of specialized interest groups 
in the political process); Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust:  Equal 
Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565 (2013) 
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Democratic Theory of American Election Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 259, 264–67 (2016) 
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 140. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Testing Shaw v. Reno:  Do Majority-
Minority Districts Cause Expressive Harms?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1041, 1063 (2015). 
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2.  Racial Gerrymandering Doctrine 
The embrace of the consensus approach notwithstanding, not everyone 
perceived the legally mandated creation of majority-minority districts as a 
positive development.  A challenge brought by white plaintiffs in North 
Carolina, in response to the construction of two oddly shaped majority 
African American congressional districts in the early 1990s, allowed for the 
recognition of a new type of constitutional claim.  This claim, what 
Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi later labeled an “expressive 
harm” claim, was a bit of a curiosity.141  The plaintiffs argued that the state’s 
reliance on race in the construction of the districts violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.142  The Supreme Court’s resolution of this challenge in 
Shaw v. Reno143 is principally known for the majority’s validation of the 
plaintiffs’ claim by way of a novel conception of harm.144 
What exactly was the harm suffered by the white plaintiffs?  After all, no 
white voters were deprived of the right to vote.  No white voters suffered a 
dilution of their votes.  The plaintiffs’ claim, in fact, was premised on the 
notion that the mere use of race in the redistricting process constituted an 
affront that warranted invalidation of North Carolina’s redistricting plan.  
Reconciling this type of claim with contemporaneous election law doctrine 
was no easy task given the VRA doctrine, described in the prior section, 
which required a degree of race-consciousness in redistricting.145  Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion in Shaw is best understood as an 
announcement that the degree to which race may be taken into account when 
redistricting has limits.  Most relevantly, it offers a compelling illustration of 
how racial gerrymandering doctrine, though expressly engaged with race, is 
decidedly myopic about white identity politics. 
Justice O’Connor’s decision classified the North Carolina plan as “so 
highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as 
anything other than an effort to ‘segregat[e] . . . voters’ on the basis of 
race.”146  Racial gerrymandering, Justice O’Connor argued, “bears an 
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.”147  Accordingly, she 
reasoned, it problematically signals to both voters and elected representatives 
that race is and should be the overriding factor in political decision-
 
 141. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, Bizarre Districts, and 
Voting Rights:  Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 483, 506–07 (1993). 
 142. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642, 649 (1993). 
 143. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 144. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 493 (“Shaw now recognizes a distinct type of 
claim.  This new claim entails a distinct conception of constitutional harms as well as a distinct, 
implicit theory of political representation.”). 
 145. It is, in fact, impossible to conceive of a congressional redistricting effort that would 
not consider race to some degree. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) 
(“Redistricting legislatures will, for example, almost always be aware of racial demographics; 
but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting process.”). 
 146. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646–47 (alterations in original) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)). 
 147. Id. at 647. 
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making.148  Because, in Justice O’Connor’s view, race-driven politics is 
deeply undesirable, courts must sanction government action suggesting 
otherwise.  For her, the Court’s recognition of racial gerrymandering claims 
was a progressive undertaking, one that instigated the country’s move toward 
greater tolerance and unity: 
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society.  
They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, 
that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.  Racial 
classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.  Racial 
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into 
competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a 
political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to 
aspire.  It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state 
legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.149 
Many scholars have questioned the coherence of Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion, finding her application of traditional equal protection analysis in the 
voting-rights context to be confused.150  Moreover, the harm that so troubled 
her—the prospect of racial gerrymandering exacerbating racial division—
was abstract, it was divorced from any realist inquiry into the actual political 
environment.  For example, despite having a sizable African American 
community, North Carolina had not sent an African American to Congress 
in over ninety years.151  The challenged districts were a justifiable means of 
responding to that fact.  The congressional districts in which the plaintiffs 
lived were themselves fairly integrated, a fact that, again, raises questions 
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 149. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657. 
 150. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:  JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 142 (2003) (“In short, although the Shaw 
Court used the label of equal protection, there does not appear to be any political equality 
problem at issue in these cases.  Even when the government ‘sends a message with its conduct’ 
in a political equality case, we should view that message as irrelevant if it has no bearing on 
real political power relationships.”); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is 
Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1996) (“We believe that the Court’s attempt to 
integrate voting rights law into its more general approach to affirmative action is both 
misguided and incoherent.”).  But see Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 8, at 1573 
(“However, particularly as refracted through the lens of time and the benefit of hindsight, we 
can also see that Justice O’Connor was committed, even if comparatively less so, to a 
competing principle, which was that racial equality also demanded some modicum of race 
consciousness.”). 
 151. KOUSSER, supra note 54, at 243. 
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about the ostensible legal injury.152  Even a partial look into North Carolina’s 
political history would have uncovered the longstanding salience of white 
identity politics. 
In his remarkably rich historical study, Colorblind Injustice, J. Morgan 
Kousser devoted a chapter to what he called “a century of electoral 
discrimination in North Carolina.”153  He documented the state’s strategic 
decisions, over decades, to stifle African American political advancement.  
He also cited a study conducted at the time of Shaw, which demonstrated that 
African American and white public opinion differed markedly on questions 
about the continued presence of discrimination.154 
In addition, he found Justice O’Connor’s presumption that racial 
gerrymandering would increase racial bloc voting to be faulty, because, 
among other things, “racial bloc voting in congressional elections was 
already extremely high.”155  Further, after examining the congressional roll 
call votes of North Carolina’s delegation, both past and present, he concluded 
that “white politicians in North Carolina have overwhelmingly considered 
their ‘primary obligations’ to be to whites, while they have largely ignored 
the opinions of the black members of their constituencies.”156 
Taking account of this information presents Shaw in a different light.  In 
considering the actual political environment in North Carolina at the time, 
the Department of Justice’s mandated construction of the challenged districts 
appears well-considered.  And the information refutes Justice O’Connor’s 
antibalkanization thesis, under which racial gerrymandering expands the 
racial divide, whereas curtailing it holds the promise of racial unification.157 
Thus, the racial gerrymandering doctrine is properly labeled myopic 
because of its inattention to the actual racial consequences of its commands.  
Importantly, it is not that the doctrine eschews consequentialist reasoning 
altogether—Justice O’Connor’s core presumption is that racial 
gerrymandering will worsen race relations.  Rather, the reasoning it employs 
is unjustifiably optimistic about the declining significance of race and, 
therefore, fails to pursue or assign value to findings that undermine its 
premises. 
The indifference to such findings became a feature of the doctrine.  For 
instance, “the Court struck down Georgia’s, Texas’, and North Carolina’s 
reapportionment plans without reference to any findings that the 
representatives elected from the majority-black and majority-Hispanic 
 
 152. Id. (“[T]he districts were in fact the least segregated, most nearly racially balanced 
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districts ignored the needs of their white constituents.”158  With no searching 
judicial inquiry required, a redistricting plan’s constitutionality came to turn 
on the question of whether “race was the predominant factor motivating the 
legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or 
without a particular district.”159  Tellingly, this “predominant factor” inquiry 
scrutinizes the cosmetic features of a district while assigning no importance 
to the subtleties of the district’s racial politics.160  Judges, in adherence to the 
doctrine, are thus “willfully blind to the messy realities of the political 
process.”161 
The Court’s disinterest in considering the racial implications of politics as 
practiced was reinforced by its decision in Easley v. Cromartie.162  The case 
concerned a renewed challenge to one of the same North Carolina 
congressional districts that was at issue in Shaw.  In Cromartie, though, 
Justice O’Connor joined the liberal wing of the Court in upholding the 
district, crediting the state’s defense that politics, not race, explained its 
design.163  The notion that courts can sensibly disaggregate racial from 
political justifications is a fiction that continues to cause confusion.  
Nonetheless, Cromartie communicated to states that they can avoid Shaw 
violations by playing up the political reasons for their districting choices.164 
Shaw litigation largely ceased for nearly twenty years,165 only to recently 
reemerge in a new fashion.166  Its resurrection abounds with ironies.  First, 
unlike the initial wave of Shaw cases in which the plaintiffs were white, the 
plaintiffs in the latest series of cases have been African American.167  Second, 
rather than alleging that states’ use of race in redistricting is per se a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause, the recent plaintiffs have alleged that 
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Republican-controlled redistricting bodies have unnecessarily overpopulated 
majority-minority districts to the detriment of minority voters.168 
Consider the facts of Cooper v. Harris,169 one such case from 2017.  
Following the most recent reapportionment, the North Carolina legislature 
increased the percentage of African Americans of voting age (the “Black 
Voting Age Population,” or “BVAP”) in two of its congressional districts.  In 
District 1, the BVAP was increased from 48.6 percent to 52.7 percent.  In 
District 12, it was increased from 43.8 percent to 50.7 percent.170  Plaintiffs 
claimed that the state unjustifiably packed African American voters into 
these districts, thereby diminishing African American political influence 
elsewhere.171  The state argued in response that its decision was based, not 
on a nefarious motive, but on its obligation to avoid potential liability under 
section 2 of the VRA.172  In other words, the state claimed that failure to 
design the districts as it did might have resulted in liability for minority vote 
dilution.  Importantly, the Court has previously found compliance with the 
VRA to be a compelling justification for the consideration of race in 
redistricting.173  With regard to District 12, the state also claimed that 
politics, not race, best explained its design.174 
The Court rejected both of the state’s justifications and invalidated both 
districts.  For District 1, Justice Kagan’s opinion concluded that the state’s 
concern about avoiding section 2 liability was unfounded.175  For District 12, 
it concluded that the district court’s determination that race predominated 
over politics did not constitute clear error.176  On one level, the recent Shaw 
cases read as promising—the Court has acted to prohibit states’ use of VRA 
compliance as a pretext for the packing of minority voters.177  But the new 
Shaw doctrine is no less myopic than its earlier version, and there is reason 
to doubt courts’ ability to meaningfully mitigate white identity politics 
through its application. 
First, despite its novelty, the doctrine is at its core simply an amalgamation 
of the original racial gerrymandering doctrine and the VRA doctrine 
pertaining to the creation of majority-minority districts:  minority plaintiffs 
allege unconstitutional reliance on race in the packing of minority voters in 
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a district; states, in turn, argue that they did so in order to avoid VRA liability; 
courts are then tasked with assessing whether race did in fact predominate in 
the design of the district and, if so, whether VRA liability, absent the state’s 
design, was a live possibility.  Thus, the evidentiary factors of the greatest 
significance are the same as what are currently found in section 2 cases 
applying Gingles.178  As detailed in Part II.A.1, those factors ascertain the 
prospect of minority electoral success, not necessarily the overall political 
engagement of minority constituents. 
Second, the traditional Gingles factors only come into play once a plaintiff 
has established that race was the “predominant factor” in the packing of 
minority voters.179  As many have observed, and despite the findings in 
Cooper, savvy redistricting bodies are likely to have little difficulty raising 
political justifications for their decisions.180  As long as the Court refuses to 
police political gerrymandering,181 the reach of racial gerrymandering 
doctrine will be inherently delimited. 
Third, and more ominously, Cooper and the other recent Shaw cases can 
be read as the latest manifestation of the Court’s “long-running project of 
winding down unnecessary racial redistricting.”182  If this is an accurate 
diagnosis, the Court is, if anything, institutionally disinclined to develop 
doctrinal understandings that might account for white identity politics.183  
Others see greater promise,184 but, to date, the new Shaw doctrine, much like 
its compositional doctrines, serves to remedy only a narrow range of racially 
regressive practices. 
3.  Election Administration Issues 
An increasing number of election law disputes involve what are referred 
to as election administration issues.  These are disputes over administrative 
matters implicating the right to vote.  Most prominent has been the question 
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of whether voters can be required to show identification when voting.185  
Other matters, including the extent of states’ authority to purge voters from 
their voter rolls,186 and the authority of a state to reduce voters’ early voting 
opportunities, are similarly contentious.187 
Constitutional challenges to election administration issues are evaluated 
under a balancing test.  If a state enacts a severe restriction on the right to 
vote—that is, a restriction that is wholly unrelated to voter qualifications—
that restriction will be subject to strict scrutiny.188  If, however, the state’s 
restriction is “evenhanded” and “protect[s] the integrity and reliability of the 
electoral process,”189 courts weigh the injury to the voter “against ‘the 
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule.’”190  This balancing test has been unkind to plaintiffs in 
the Roberts Court.191 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,192 the 2008 Supreme Court 
case upholding Indiana’s voter identification law, illustrates the point.  
Justice John Paul Stevens’s majority opinion concluded that for most voters 
“the inconvenience of making a trip to the [Bureau of Motor Vehicles], 
gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does 
not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a 
significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.”193  The Court gave 
great credence to Indiana’s claimed interests in defense of the law, namely, 
the modernization of its election procedures, the prevention of voter fraud, 
and the safeguarding of voter confidence.194  The same justifications were 
successfully relied upon by other states when their voter identification laws 
were challenged as constitutionally defective.195  Further, Justice Stevens 
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genuine disagreement as to whether their effect is discriminatory by virtue of their mounting 
cumulative burden.”). 
 186. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018). 
 187. NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 226 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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 195. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We have said enough 
to demonstrate that Crawford requires us to reject a constitutional challenge to Wisconsin’s 
statute.”); Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1277–78 (N.D. 
Ala. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-10151 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018). 
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rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the law’s unanimous support by 
Republicans and unanimous opposition by Democrats was enough on its own 
to warrant invalidation.196 
In the lower courts, and in election administration cases not involving 
voter identification, the balancing test has been unpredictably applied.197  It 
is a self-consciously “flexible standard.”198  That said, it provides space for 
courts to undertake a “pragmatic” inquiry into whether “there is an 
identifiable burden on the franchise and, if so, whether it is really 
necessary.”199  To date, the doctrine has only tepidly engaged with race, 
treating evidence of the racially disparate impact of a given voting restriction 
as “part of a preliminary determination of whether a burden of production 
would shift to the defendant.”200 
In sum, the constitutional test for evaluating noninvidious election 
administration issues is a pragmatic balancing test that weighs the injury to 
the voter against the state’s proffered justifications.  It has been applied quite 
deferentially to states by the Roberts Court,201 though more unpredictably by 
lower courts.  It eschews partisan motivation as an independently significant 
factor in assessing voting restrictions, assuming the existence of any other 
justification,202 and engages race only indirectly, by viewing the racially 
disparate impact of a given voting restriction not as cause for invalidation, 
but as an evidentiary finding that states must rebut. 
What about statutory challenges to election administration laws?  These 
challenges, so-called “vote denial” challenges, typically are brought under 
section 2 of the VRA.  Race plays a much more central role in section 2 vote 
denial cases, but even here white identity politics is not addressed head-on.  
Some background to section 2 vote denial cases is necessary.  Part II.A.1 
described the history of how section 2, following Gingles, evolved to combat 
vote dilution—the systematic dilution of minority votes.  Recall that 
section 2 provides that: 
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color . . . .203 
 
 196. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (“But if a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid 
neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan 
interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”). 
 197. Compare, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(employing specific “guidelines” for evaluating a restriction under the balancing test and 
finding in favor of the state), with Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(using a broad gloss on the language of the balancing test and finding in favor of the plaintiff). 
 198. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 199. Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 313. 
 200. Id. at 318. 
 201. Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 
554 (2015) (describing both substantive and procedural forms of deference). 
 202. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 317–18 (citing “one-party exclusive control of the 
election administration process” as a factor that courts have considered). 
 203. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012). 
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Gingles interpreted this language to prohibit the use of dilutive electoral 
structures that made it either impossible or unlikely for minority voters to 
elect candidates of choice. 
But in recent years section 2 has been used as a tool for challenging ballot 
access or election administration laws.  Because the section 2 doctrine 
initially evolved in response to vote dilution challenges, courts have had to 
develop a new section 2 doctrine to address its application in the context of 
vote denial.204  The Supreme Court has never decided a section 2 vote denial 
case, leaving the evolving doctrine in a state of uncertainty. 
The doctrine that has emerged from the lower courts includes a two-
element test.  First, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the challenged practice 
“imposes a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning 
that members of the protected class ‘have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.’”205  Second, the challenged practice “must 
in part be caused by or linked to ‘social and historical conditions’ that have 
or currently produce discrimination against members of the protected 
class.”206 
In addition, courts have revived the centrality of a “totality of the 
circumstances” inquiry,207 undertaken in reliance on a list of nine factors 
listed in the Senate report on the VRA that are an important component of its 
legislative history.208  Historically, these factors were of minimal importance 
 
 204. Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial 
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section 2’s use as a tool for challenging vote denial). 
 205. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301). 
 206. Id. at 240 (quoting Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 
554 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14–3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 
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 207. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 246 (5th Cir. 2016); League of Women 
Voters, 769 F.3d at 240 (quoting Ohio State Conference, 768 F.3d at 554); Ohio State 
Conference, 768 F.3d at 550, 554. 
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1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political 
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have been denied access to that process; 
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employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the 
political process; 
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appeals; 
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given the degree to which the three Gingles prerequisites came to define 
section 2 vote dilution litigation, but were nonetheless intended to guide the 
inquiry that accompanies satisfaction of the prerequisites.  In the context of 
section 2 vote denial cases, where the Gingles prerequisites are inapposite, 
the totality of the circumstances inquiry is paramount.209 
The nascent section 2 vote denial doctrine has been a topic of interest for 
scholars largely because its relationship to longstanding constitutional and 
statutory voting rights doctrines is unclear.  What constitutes a discriminatory 
burden under the first element?  What qualifies as a meaningful “social or 
historical condition” under the second element?  Is the current test so 
constitutionally vulnerable that it should be refined?210  A number of 
insightful suggestions have been offered in response to these questions. 
Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos supports applying existing law 
governing disparate impact liability in other contexts to vote denial 
challenges.211  Professor Samuel Issacharoff queries whether vote denial 
jurisprudence might be guided by a “rule of reason” akin to that which exists 
in antitrust law.212  Professor Pamela Karlan provides a sophisticated analysis 
of how courts have incorporated the Senate report factors to date, 
highlighting in particular the emerging importance of the final factor, which 
assesses whether the policy underlying a given restriction is “tenuous.”213  
Karlan contends that an initial showing of partisan motivation should 
function as a “strong presumption” that a section 2 violation has occurred.214  
 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public 
office in the jurisdiction[;] 
. . .  
[8.] whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected 
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group[; and] 
[9.] whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such 
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is 
tenuous. 
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Professor Daniel Tokaji, raising a concern that the current test is 
constitutionally vulnerable, advocates adding a third element to the test, one 
that permits defendants to justify their laws by clear and convincing 
evidence.215 
To this Article’s argument, the nascent section 2 vote denial doctrine holds 
substantial promise for mitigating white identity politics.  Though the 
doctrine is underdeveloped at this point—hence my categorization of it as 
myopic—there is a loose correspondence between some of the Senate report 
factors and the harms inflicted by white identity politics.  As further 
developed in Part IV, the emphasis the current test places on social and 
historical conditions, coupled with the revitalization of the Senate report 
factors, offer openings for the realist consideration of politics this Article 
endorses. 
4.  Campaign Finance Doctrine 
For all of its complexity, campaign finance doctrine does not directly 
attend to race.  The questions that have shaped the doctrine—such as which 
entities may spend money in relation to elections; what constitutes 
“coordination” between outside groups and political campaigns; should the 
right to speak through the strength of one’s wallet, which is protected by the 
First Amendment, give way to reform efforts designed to effectuate greater 
equality in political participation as ensured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment216—are in essence debates about free expression and political 
equality, not about racial discrimination.  There are no laws, for instance, that 
permit one racial group to spend more money than another in campaigns or 
elections.  Nor are there laws alleged to have a disparate impact on minority 
groups.  Accordingly, it is unsurprising that campaign finance doctrine is 
myopic when it comes to race. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine is worth a brief mention for two reasons.  First, 
as is now painfully obvious, money plays an immensely important role in 
American politics and particularly so when it comes to the dissemination of 
political advertisements.217  The deregulatory turn in the campaign finance 
doctrine has incentivized the giving of money to so-called “outside” groups, 
namely, super political action committees (super PACs) and 501(c)(4) 
organizations.218  These groups, which are unaccountable to the American 
public, are often able to obscure where their money comes from and often 
run racially charged advertisements that foment white identity politics.  So, 
while the doctrine itself is agnostic on the issue of race, one consequence of 
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the doctrine’s recent trajectory is the exacerbation of white identity politics.  
In Part III.C, I explore this development and the question of whether 
campaign finance reform may have the supplemental benefit of mitigating 
white identity politics. 
A second reason for discussing campaign finance doctrine and race is that 
the topic has received influential treatment in the literature.  More precisely, 
scholars have already recognized the doctrine’s racial myopia and offered 
arguments for reform that expressly take race into account.  While I am 
dubious of the remedial aspects of these arguments, they are worth 
consideration. 
The principal advocate for a revised understanding of campaign finance 
doctrine and race is Professor Spencer Overton.  Overton criticizes courts’ 
reliance on the First Amendment to “undermine legislative restrictions on the 
use of political money.”219  This approach, he asserts, disadvantages African 
Americans insofar as it “enshrine[s] the existing distribution of property as a 
baseline for political advantage.”220  In doing so, he notes, courts ignore the 
fact that “past discriminatory laws inevitably impair the ability of people of 
color to exercise rights over economic resources to participate in the political 
process.”221 
While Overton is undoubtedly correct that any electoral system that 
allocates influence based on wealth is disadvantageous to African 
Americans, it is difficult to conceive of a constitutional interest that, at least 
under existing doctrine, gives this observation legal significance.222  While 
racial equality might be invoked, it alone provides no recognizable 
constitutional basis for remedying wealth disparities between whites and 
others.  Moreover, as Professor Issacharoff has argued, “the infusion of 
equality concerns drawn from equal protection law is unlikely to push aside 
the ongoing force of deep-seated First Amendment considerations in 
campaign finance law.”223  As for the VRA, Overton himself concedes its 
inadequacy as a remedial tool for the problem he examines.224 
In short, campaign finance doctrine is doctrinally divorced from traditional 
equal protection concerns pertaining to racial classifications and from 
disparate impact analysis under the VRA.  In contrast, legislation is evaluated 
under a First Amendment analysis that assigns great weight to the speech 
rights of individuals, corporate entities, and unions.  While some scholars 
have argued that race should play a larger role in both judicial analysis and 
reform efforts, to date, this has not occurred.  Yet, while race is not directly 
implicated in the doctrine, the trajectory of the doctrine has, I argue, 
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exacerbated white identity politics, and existing calls for reform hold the 
potential to serve a mitigating function. 
B.  Minimization 
While myopia regarding white identity politics is the norm in election law 
doctrines, there are examples of doctrines that, at one point, scrupulously 
engaged the issue.  This section describes two doctrines—the constitutional 
vote dilution doctrine and the political restructuring doctrine—that initially 
exhibited cognizance of white identity politics, yet, over time, have been 
minimized to the point of irrelevance.  Evaluating these doctrines is helpful 
in understanding courts’ capacity for undertaking probative, contextual 
inquiries into how race informs political decision-making. 
1.  Constitutional Vote Dilution 
In the wake of the 1970 U.S. Census, Texas, like every other state, adopted 
a new reapportionment plan.225  The plan’s design for the Texas House of 
Representatives contained a mix of both single-member and multimember 
districts.226  Two of the proposed multimember districts were constructed in 
Dallas and Bexar Counties, each of which contained sizable minority 
communities.  In constructing multimember districts in those counties, as 
opposed to the single-member alternative, the state effectively precluded the 
possibility of minority voters electing their preferred candidates.  Because 
racially polarized voting was so consistent, state officials knew that the white 
majority within the multimember districts would unfailingly elect only white 
legislators. 
Seeing their voting strength diminished, minority voters in both counties 
challenged the construction of the multimember districts as a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, alleging invidious discrimination.227  A three-judge 
district court held in their favor, and the state appealed directly to the 
Supreme Court.228  Justice Byron White’s unanimous opinion in White v. 
Regester,229 affirming the district court’s ruling, compiled a host of findings 
exemplifying the extent to which courts, at one point in time, exhibited 
cognizance of the pervasiveness of white identity politics. 
Turning first to Dallas County, Justice White commented on “the history 
of official racial discrimination in Texas, which at times touched the right of 
Negroes to register and vote and to participate in the democratic 
processes.”230  He went on to note that “since Reconstruction days, there have 
only been two Negroes in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House 
of Representatives.”231  Moreover, those two individuals were specifically 
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chosen by a gatekeeper entity, the Dallas Committee for Responsible 
Government, an entity that, “as recently as 1970,”232 had “rel[ied] upon 
‘racial campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat candidates who had the 
overwhelming support of the black community.’”233 
The comparison between Justice White’s perspicacious inquiry in White 
and the formulaic approach seen in the section 2 and racial gerrymandering 
doctrines described above is noteworthy.  Rather than narrowly focusing on 
frustrated electoral success, Justice White’s expanded frame more 
comprehensively considered the political lives of African Americans in 
Dallas County.  He considered white identity politics in the electorate, in 
government, and in Texas’s political parties.234  His inquiry into the Mexican 
American community in Bexar County was equally probing. 
There, Justice White acknowledged that the Mexican American 
community, not only in Bexar County, but in Texas itself, “had long ‘suffered 
from, and continues to suffer from, the results and effects of invidious 
discrimination and treatment in the fields of education, employment, 
economics, health, politics and others.’”235  State legislators were 
“insufficiently responsive to Mexican-American interests.”236  Describing 
life in “the Barrio,”237 the Court took as significant the “poor housing” and 
“high rate of unemployment” among the residents.238  These accumulated 
disadvantages, the Court found, are compounded by “a cultural and language 
barrier that makes . . . participation in community processes extremely 
difficult.”239 
All of these factors informed the Court’s determination that the 
construction of a dilutive multimember district in Bexar County was 
discriminatory.  Replacing it with a set of single-member districts, the Court 
reasoned, would help “to bring the community into the full stream of political 
life of the county and State by encouraging their further registration, voting, 
and other political activities.”240  White offers one of the strongest examples 
of the Court honestly examining the vastness of white identity politics.  It 
was the interaction between past discrimination, the lingering effects of that 
discrimination, political marginalization, and the multimember electoral 
structure, that, in combination, justified the holding.241 
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To be sure, the imprecision of the standard for establishing constitutional 
vote dilution gave many pause,242 a shortcoming that was only partially 
improved upon in subsequent case law.243  But the general approach, 
nonetheless, proved functional over the course of several years.244  In Mobile 
v. Bolden,245 however, the doctrine’s utility was considerably minimized. 
In Bolden, a plurality of the Court held that a successful constitutional vote 
dilution claim requires plaintiffs to show proof of discriminatory intent.246  
At issue in the case was the constitutionality of an at-large system for electing 
city commissioners in Mobile, Alabama.247  Justice Potter Stewart’s plurality 
decision held that “only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”248  
As noted by one expert, “the Supreme Court’s Bolden decision changed what 
had been a formidable burden of proof for plaintiffs to an impossible one in 
many instances.”249 
Bolden’s replacement of the capacious approach taken in White with a 
narrower, intent-based approach marks an important shift in the doctrine.  No 
longer was the sort of historical, circumstantial evidence relied on in White 
of much legal significance.250  Such evidence, the plurality noted, was “most 
assuredly insufficient to prove an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose 
in the present case.”251  Bolden inspired a response in the civil and voting 
rights communities, which successfully lobbied Congress to amend section 2 
of the VRA to include a “results” test.252 
It was that amendment, as interpreted in Gingles, that established section 2 
as the principal tool for challenging vote-dilutive structures.  That doctrine’s 
focus on minority electoral success, detailed in Part II.A.1, curbed courts’ 
interest in rigorously appraising the many permutations of white identity 
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politics.  In addition, it deflected attention from Bolden’s minimization of 
constitutional vote dilution doctrine—a doctrine that for a brief period justly 
treated race as a central variable in understanding a range of political choices. 
2.  Political Restructuring Doctrine 
A second doctrine, though orthogonal to traditional election law doctrines, 
provides another example of how the import of white identity politics has 
been judicially minimized over time.  The so-called “political restructuring,” 
or “political process” doctrine, is characterized by close judicial scrutiny of 
political restructurings that work to the disadvantage of racial minorities.253  
Like the constitutional vote dilution doctrine, the political restructuring 
doctrine initially exhibited cognizance of the nefariousness of white identity 
politics, yet has been substantially minimized over time. 
The political restructuring doctrine, as many have noted, bears an awkward 
relationship to traditional equal protection doctrine.254  Rather than evaluate 
the facial impermissibility of a government classification by way of the 
traditional levels of scrutiny, the doctrine calls for examination of whether a 
political restructuring—most commonly a voter initiative—places “special 
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process.”255  In two 
cases, Hunter v. Erickson256 and Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1,257 the Supreme Court invalidated facially nondiscriminatory political 
restructurings that were seen as disadvantageous to minorities.258  More 
recently, though, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,259 the 
Court minimized the political restructuring doctrine to the point of 
irrelevance. 
Hunter involved an amendment to Akron, Ohio’s city charter, passed by 
way of citizen initiative, which repealed an open housing law.260  In addition, 
the charter amendment “prevent[ed] the city council from implementing any 
ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in 
housing without the approval of the majority of the voters in Akron.”261  By 
its terms, then, the charter amendment drew no racial distinctions that, under 
traditional equal protection doctrine, would subject it to strict scrutiny.  The 
Court nevertheless struck it as racially discriminatory. 
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The charter amendment’s unconstitutionality lay in its creation of “a 
distinction between those groups who sought the law’s protection against 
racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations in the sale and rental of real 
estate and those who sought to regulate real property transactions in the 
pursuit of other ends.”262  The “reality,” the Court stated, “is that the law’s 
impact falls on the minority.”263  As such, “[t]he classification in Hunter was 
not quite a racial classification on its face; but, by its very nature, it gave rise 
to suspicion that an impermissible motive was at work.”264 
From where did the Court’s suspicions arise?  Partially from the 
inadequacy of the city’s justifications.265  But the Court also drew a 
contextually informed inference about the motives of the charter 
amendment’s endorsers.  In a key passage, Justice White looked to the actual 
living conditions of Akron’s minority residents: 
The preamble to the open housing ordinance which was suspended by [the 
charter amendment] recited that the population of Akron consists of 
“people of different race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, many 
of whom live in circumscribed and segregated areas, under sub-standard, 
unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions, because of 
discrimination in the sale, lease, rental and financing of housing.”  Such 
was the situation in Akron.  It is against this background that the 
referendum required by [the charter amendment] must be assessed.266 
This background informed the Court’s conclusion that the charter 
amendment was impermissibly motivated.267 
The Court’s skepticism of the city’s justifications is notable.  The decision 
contains no express allegations of racism on the part of Akron’s white 
electorate.  Yet one can presume invidious intent, the Court suggests, through 
acknowledgment of the plight endured by Akron’s minority communities.  
Particularly instructive is the Court’s invocation of Anderson v. Martin,268 a 
case invalidating a Louisiana law that required political candidates to reveal 
their race in nominating papers and on ballots.269  In striking the law in 
Anderson, the Court condemned the transparent attempt to “furnish[] a 
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one 
group because of race and for another.”270  Reliance on Anderson in resolving 
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Hunter, therefore, indicates recognition that white identity politics were at 
work.271 
The import of white identity politics in Seattle School District is less 
apparent, yet the Court was nonetheless willing to draw inferences about its 
materiality.  The case involved a citizen initiative in Washington State, which 
prohibited local school boards from implementing a desegregation plan, a 
component of which mandated the busing of students to alleviate racial 
imbalances.272  The initiative—supported by 66 percent of the voters273—
was invalidated by the district court, which likened it to the charter 
amendment struck down in Hunter.274  As in Hunter, the political process 
was restructured such that it was made more difficult for racial minorities to 
obtain government action thought to advance their interests.  The contextual 
evidence of racism, however, was by comparison less discernible. 
Justice Harry Blackmun’s 5-4 opinion asserted that “there is little doubt 
that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial purposes.”275  In support 
of that statement he noted that “the text of the initiative was carefully tailored 
to interfere only with desegregative busing.”276  It was evident that 
“desegregation of the public schools, like the Akron open housing ordinance, 
at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed for 
that purpose.”277  Moreover, “busing for integration . . . now engenders 
considerably more controversy than does the sort of fair housing ordinance 
debated in Hunter.”278  These observations alone were sufficient for the 
Court to infer that the initiative was impermissibly motivated. 
In Seattle School District, as in Hunter, the Court demonstrated a 
willingness to censure efforts to activate white identity politics.  Steve 
Sanders captures the point in his examination of the opinion’s language:  
“Verbs like ‘drawn,’ ‘tailored,’ and ‘singled out’ indicate that the Court 
thought the voters of Washington had made a conscious choice to adopt a 
busing policy because of, not in spite of, its anticipated effect of frustrating 
racial desegregation.”279  Hunter and Seattle School District demonstrate that 
the judicial oversight of white identity politics has precedent.  Where the 
political restructuring doctrine stands at present, however, is another matter 
entirely. 
 
 271. Steve Sanders, Race, Restructurings, and Equal Protection Doctrine Through the 
Lens of Schuette v. BAMN, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1393, 1414 (2016) (“To be sure, the Justices 
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The Court’s most recent application of the political restructuring doctrine 
seemingly marks its demise.  At issue in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action was the constitutionality of an initiative that, through 
amendment to the state of Michigan’s constitution, banned the use of racial 
preferences by the state in “public employment, public education, or public 
contracting.”280  The challenge that reached the Court was to the initiative’s 
operation with regard to state universities, which, under the authority granted 
to independent boards of trustees, took race into account in admissions.  The 
Sixth Circuit, in both panel281 and en banc282 decisions, found the initiative 
invalid under the political restructuring doctrine.  The en banc decision was 
then reversed by the Court. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing only for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justice Alito, distinguished both Hunter and Seattle School District.283  
Hunter, Justice Kennedy noted, involved “a demonstrated injury on the basis 
of race that, by reasons of state encouragement or participation, became more 
aggravated.”284  Seattle School District involved a ban on busing which “had 
the serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on account of 
race.”285  Because, Justice Kennedy reasoned, Seattle had a history of 
enforced school segregation,286 the Court was justified in invalidating an 
attempt to restructure the political process so as to disadvantage those African 
Americans who supported mandatory busing.287 
In contrast, a ban on the use of racial preferences in university admissions 
does not involve “infliction of a specific injury of the kind at issue in . . . 
Hunter and in the history of the Seattle schools.”288  In drawing this 
conclusion, Justice Kennedy circumscribed the breadth of the political 
restructuring doctrine, limiting its relevance to instances in which intentional 
discrimination is rather pronounced.  With regard to the initiative itself, he 
presented an analytically disputable string of arguments that ignored the 
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racial overtones of the affirmative action debate altogether.  Rather than 
honestly appraise the debate as one in which white identity politics are 
routinely exploited289 and acknowledge that access to higher education 
remains out of reach for many black and brown youths, Justice Kennedy 
portrayed the initiative process as the manifestation of a healthy 
democracy.290  After Schuette, the political restructuring doctrine is 
obsolete.291 
In both the constitutional vote dilution and political restructuring 
doctrines, the Supreme Court, at one time, demonstrated an interest in 
scrutinizing the particular ways in which white identity politics undermines 
political equality.  Whether considering the lingering effects of past 
discrimination, the political marginalization of minorities through structural 
means, or the tendency of particular public issues to activate race-based 
decision-making, the Court exhibited an awareness of the actual role of race 
in public life.  That cognizance is now absent from both doctrines, both of 
which have been minimized to the point where they are functionally 
indistinguishable from traditional equal protection doctrine.  And the 
prospect of reclaiming what has been lost is dim. 
III.  WHITE IDENTITY POLITICS, DOCTRINAL DISREGARD, 
AND THE THREAT OF INTENSIFICATION 
An optimism pervades election law jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court 
pays lip service to the nation’s history of discrimination while administering 
formalist doctrines that are unjustifiably sanguine about the state of 
American politics.  As explained above, white identity politics is a pervasive 
political feature, one that is habitually exploited by the Republican Party.  
This assessment runs contrary to that to which the Court aspires and is 
generally not relevant under traditional doctrines, hence the existence of what 
I have labeled racial blind spots. 
This Part explicates those blind spots, showing how the doctrines I have 
categorized as myopic adopt defective theories of politics, obscure more than 
they clarify, and, in some instances, threaten to intensify white identity 
politics.  In making this argument, the following enumeration may be helpful.  
Of initial concern is the doctrines’ treatment of the Republican Party as a 
race-neutral political actor.  A quick point of clarification:  in referring to the 
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Republican Party here, I mean party members holding public office, for 
instance, those in state legislatures.  Public officials, of course, do not 
comprise the entirety of a political party.292  A second concern is the 
doctrines’ treatment of the electorate as race neutral.  And the final concern 
is the doctrines’ treatment of those whom we might conceive of as “external” 
political actors as race neutral.  I consider each aspect of the doctrines in turn. 
A.  The Republican Party as Race Neutral 
One of the more striking political developments of the past century is the 
near extinction of white Democratic elected officials in the South.293  This 
phenomenon, a consequence of party realignment and persistent racially 
polarized voting, forms the backdrop for much of the region’s racial politics.  
Republican-controlled redistricting bodies operate with the knowledge that 
race and partisanship are exceedingly correlated and, accordingly, create 
majority-white districts that guarantee electoral success. 
This tactic is lost on no one.  It is openly acknowledged by both courts and 
scholars.294  Yet, in multiple doctrines, race and party are treated as 
distinguishable.295  Adherence to that fiction frustrates the development of a 
realist jurisprudence.  The point to be emphasized is that in many 
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jurisdictions, the Republican Party’s redistricting decisions are themselves 
manifestations of white identity politics. 
White identity politics, as defined above, involves the creation of beliefs 
and alliances intended to advance the collective political interests of white 
voters.  The creation of majority-white districts intended to immunize white 
voters from electoral competition satisfies this definition.  Moreover, the 
officials elected from these predominantly white districts have a diminished 
incentive to serve the small percentage of minority constituents they 
represent, an outcome that also accrues to the benefit of white 
communities.296  To the point, across the South at present, Republican 
politicians, backed by strong support from white voters, oppose social 
policies they perceive as benefitting minorities.297  Yet the VRA vote dilution 
and racial gerrymandering doctrines rarely treat partisan behavior as 
corroborative of racial intent. 
This approach, at a minimum, severely complicates the doctrines’ utility.  
The point is perhaps best illustrated by examining how courts evaluate 
legislative purpose.  Take the recent voting rights litigation arising from 
Texas.  Historically, Texas has spawned a sizable share of the voting rights 
doctrine cases that pertain to race.298  Shifting demographics have, as of late, 
threatened Republican Party control,299 a development that has generated 
voter suppresion efforts300 and resulted in further litigation. 
In resolving the latest dispute—involving racial gerrymandering and racial 
vote dilution that a district court deemed impermissible—Justice Samuel 
Alito’s 5-4 decision in Abbott v. Perez301 adverted to “the presumption of 
legislative good faith.”302  In denying deference to the district court’s 
determination that the redistricting plans at issue, though since amended, 
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were marred by their discriminatory origin, the Court struck a markedly 
credulous tone.  The state’s explanations, to Justice Alito’s eye, were 
“entirely reasonable and certainly legitimate.”303  That was not the view of 
the district court, which found that Republican officials had strategically 
reassigned Hispanic voters in Travis County for partisan gain.304  To the 
extent that the VRA and racial gerrymandering doctrines even indirectly 
assign legal significance to such evidence absent supplemental evidence of 
intentional discrimination, that allowance stands in doubt following Abbott.  
Justice Alito’s opinion assigns no apparent weight to the conventionality of 
white identity politics in either the districts at issue or Texas more 
generally.305 
Virginia provides another illustrative case study.  The state’s 2011 
redistricting process produced a spate of litigation, with challenges brought 
against the design of both a dozen state legislative districts and the Third 
Congressional District.306  Of particular note is that the state legislature, in 
designing the districts—all of which were predominantly African 
American—chose to assign them no less than a 55 percent BVAP.307  This 
was despite the fact that some of the districts had previously contained lower 
BVAPs. 
In accordance with racial gerrymandering doctrine, the reviewing courts 
were first tasked with assessing whether race was the predominant motive in 
the state’s choices.308  In both cases, that was found to be true.309  Yet the 
state legislature justified its use of the racial threshold by appealing to 
section 5 of the VRA (still operative in Virginia at the time).  The VRA, the 
state argued, prohibited the state from designing districts that would have a 
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retrogressive effect on minority voters, and the use of the racial threshold 
confirmed that there would be no such effect.  The courts found this defense 
baseless and determined that section 5 compliance did not require use of a 
racial threshold.310 
At first glance, the courts’ holdings appear astute.  The Republican-
controlled state legislature’s optimal course of action would have been to 
pack as many African American voters as possible into as few majority-
minority districts as were required to be constructed in order to avoid VRA 
liability.  The arbitrary use of the racial threshold betrayed, at a minimum, 
the lack of an evidentiary basis for the districts and, at worst, white identity 
politics in action.  The courts, then, appropriately prevented this impropriety. 
But a closer look at the decisions leaves cause for concern.311  In the 
challenge to the state legislative districts, the court made adverse credibility 
findings with regard to two of the experts defending the plan.312  And the use 
of the racial threshold was not in dispute.  Moreover, in its assessment of 
whether race or partisanship best explained the plan, the court noted that a 
third expert, also defending the plan, “explicitly endorsed [the] use of race, 
due to the correlation between race and political preference, as the foundation 
for ‘partisan’ line-drawing decisions.”313  In short, the record evidence 
strongly supported a finding that race was not only predominant, but crudely 
relied upon as a proxy for partisanship. 
The same can be said in the challenge to the Third Congressional District.  
The plan’s chief sponsor was outspoken in his view that race was the 
predominant motive in the district’s design,314 a finding, again, bolstered by 
the use of the racial threshold.  And the state’s political justifications were 
“post-hoc”315 and in conflict with the rest of the record evidence.  In sum, 
the evidence in both cases was heavily favorable to the plaintiffs. 
I offer this case analysis in support of my larger claim.  The doctrines, as 
currently applied, are not attuned to white identity politics.  So, whether one 
agrees with the particular case outcomes in Abbott or in the Virginia cases is 
inapposite.  In all of the cases, one can see the limits of the current approach.  
What if Virginia had not used a precise numerical threshold?  What if the 
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legislative sponsors of the plans had been less forthcoming about their use of 
race in meeting the demands of the VRA?  What if the state advanced more 
compelling political justifications?  The fact that a given redistricting plan’s 
constitutionality turns on such doctrinal imprecision is discomfiting. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Republican Party is treated as race 
neutral in areas other than redistricting, as in cases involving election 
administration issues.  This is so despite the fact that, as Professor Issacharoff 
has written, “the single predictor necessary to determine whether a state will 
impose voter-access restrictions is whether Republicans control the ballot-
access process.”316  Voter-access and related restrictions predominantly 
burden African American and Latino voters.317  Yet their partisan origin does 
not centrally factor into challenges brought against them.318  As discussed 
earlier, the fact that Indiana’s voter identification law was unanimously 
supported by Republicans and unaminously opposed by Democrats did not 
meaningfully influence the Court’s decision to uphold the law.319  Overall, 
therefore, the relationship between white identity politics and the Republican 
Party’s systematic imposition of voter-access restrictions receives no serious 
doctrinal acknowledgement.   
B.  The Electorate as Race Neutral 
A number of complexities accompany consideration of election law 
doctrines’ treatment of the electorate as race neutral.  For one, as has been 
established throughout, race intersects with partisanship to such an extent 
that it is hard to draw conclusions about when race independently motivates 
political behavior.  Courts are not ideally suited to perform the requisite 
analysis.  Second, the characterization is plainly untrue in certain areas, as in 
the doctrines governing racial redistricting, where the inquiry into racially 
polarized voting is paramount.320  Third, voters are, of course, not state 
actors, and their political activity is protected under the First Amendment.  
Accordingly, no matter how pronounced the political divide between whites 
and minorities, courts have no basis for adjudicating claims involving white 
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 318. Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139, 142–
43 (2013) (“Nor has the Court exhibited an eagerness to invalidate other forms of election 
laws, like voter ID requirements, that have a veneer of a policy justification—even when the 
evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the desire to secure a partisan advantage actually 
motivated the enactment of these laws.”); Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 321 (“For voting-rights 
law, however, assessing improper partisan motivation has proved the third rail of electoral 
challenges.”); see also Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1094 
(D. Ariz. 2016) (commenting on “the dearth of authority for treating party affiliation as a 
suspect class”).  But see Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm 
Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 401 (2017). 
 319. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008). 
 320. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 427 (2006); Elmendorf 
et al., supra note 5, at 589; Greiner, supra note 5, at 448–49. 
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identity politics in the electorate.  The observation nevertheless remains 
important. 
To understand why, it is necessary to revisit the way in which courts 
scrutinize states’ election administration laws, first outlined in Part II.A.3.  
Recall the approach:  If a state enacts a severe restriction on the right to 
vote—that is, a restriction that is wholly unrelated to voter qualifications—
that restriction will be subject to strict scrutiny.321  If, however, the state’s 
restriction is “evenhanded” and “protect[s] the integrity and reliability of the 
electoral process itself,”322 courts weigh the injury to the voter against the 
“precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule.”323  Recall as well that this is the approach used to 
evaluate, inter alia, voter identification laws. 
Professor Joshua Douglas has highlighted how extraordinarily deferential 
the Supreme Court has been to states’ noninvidious restrictions and how it 
has given enormous credence to their stated interest in protecting “election 
integrity.”324  Election integrity, in turn, often rests on what the Court has 
labeled “voter confidence.”325  Others have rightly questioned the dubious 
nature of the Court’s solicitude about voter confidence,326 but a related 
concern arising from the existence of white identity politics in the electorate 
has gone unaddressed. 
Consider the following:  In a leading study on public perceptions of voter 
identification laws, researchers found a sizable partisan split:  “In 2012, 
Democratic support for photo ID laws had fallen to 54.4%; by 2014 it had 
fallen even further, to 51.8%.  Republican support measured 88.4% in 2012 
and 91.2% in 2014.”327  Because voter identification laws are a low-salience 
issue within the electorate, the researchers additionally measured the 
opinions of “high-information partisans.”328  Between 2008 and 2012, 
support for voter identification laws among high-information Democrats 
 
 321. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189–90. 
 322. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). 
 323. Id. at 190 (quoting Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 324. Douglas, supra note 201, at 561. 
 325. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191; Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11th 
Cir. 2009); Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1277–78 (N.D. 
Ala. 2018) (“Thus, Secretary Merrill is not required to prove that voter fraud exists (although 
he has done so), that the Photo ID Law helps deter voter fraud, or that the law increases 
confidence in elections.  Supreme Court precedent mandates that Alabama’s justifications for 
the law are valid.”), appeal docketed, No. 18-10151 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018). 
 326. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder:  
The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 1737, 1760 (2008); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Empirical Legitimacy and Election 
Law, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS:  RECURRING PUZZLES 
IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 117, 128 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s confidence-oriented interventions in the electoral process have been based entirely on 
conjecture about the functional relationships of interest.”). 
 327. Charles Stewart III et al., Revisiting Public Opinion on Voter Identification and Voter 
Fraud in an Era of Increasing Partisan Polarization, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2016). 
 328. Id. at 1465. 
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dropped to 37 percent, whereas support among high-information 
Republicans remained above 90 percent.329 
Consider as well the research of the social scientists Keith Bentele and Erin 
O’Brien, who found “a very substantial and significant association between 
the racial composition of a state’s residents or active electorate and both the 
proposal and passage of voter restriction legislation.”330  Such legislation, 
they argue, was part of “an elite countermovement”331 staged in response to 
“the broader demographic changes widely viewed as troublesome for 
Republicans and strong minority turnout and support for the first non-white 
major party presidential nominee.”332 
A third study, conducted by the political scientists David Wilson and Paul 
Brewer, found that “[s]upport for voter ID laws is strongest among 
Republicans, conservatives, and those with higher levels of racial resentment, 
as well as with regular Fox News viewers and those who perceive voting 
fraud as common.”333  The debate over voter identification laws and voter 
fraud, therefore, appears to be imbued with racial concerns.334  More 
recently, of course, President Trump has himself racialized the debate, 
arguing that millions of undocumented immigrations cast illegal ballots that 
cost him the popular vote.335 
In light of these studies, the fundamental concern is that “light-touch 
judicial review”336 that upholds voter identification laws based on states’ 
invocation of voter confidence substantiates racial hostility.  In other words, 
judicial deference based on states’ stated desire to preserve voter 
confidence—by passing a voter identification law—ignores the animus 
animating public opinion on this topic.  Because the interplay between race, 
partisanship, and voter confidence in this context is so fraught, courts should 
not grant deference based on voter confidence. 
 
 329. Id. at 1464–65. 
 330. Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0?  Why States Consider and Adopt 
Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1088, 1103 (2013). 
 331. Id. at 1105. 
 332. Id. 
 333. David C. Wilson & Paul R. Brewer, The Foundations of Public Opinion on Voter ID 
Laws:  Political Predispositions, Racial Resentment, and Information Effects, 77 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 962, 980 (2013); see also Antoine J. Banks & Heather M. Hicks, Fear and Implicit 
Racism:  Whites’ Support for Voter ID Laws, 37 POL. PSYCHOL. 641, 653 (2016) (“Consistent 
with Wilson and Brewer’s results (2013), we also find that explicit racism is a strong predictor 
of Whites’ opinions toward voter ID laws.”). 
 334. See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 2874–75 (suggesting that the voter identification 
debate is racially coded). 
 335. Michael D. Shear & Peter Baker, After His Claim of Voter Fraud, Trump Vows ‘Major 
Investigation,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/ 
trump-voting-fraud-false-claim-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/CCA9-3WVR]; Michael 
Wines & Maggie Haberman, Trump Closes Voter Fraud Panel That Bickered More Than It 
Revealed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/voting-fraud-
commission.html [https://perma.cc/432S-NW6E]. 
 336. Douglas, supra note 201, at 553. 
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Were courts to follow this advice there would be little remaining 
justification for voter identification laws.337  The same logic should apply in 
other election administration contexts.  Troublingly, at present, courts are 
granting deference without requiring states to introduce any evidence in 
support of their claim that a given law will improve electoral integrity or 
improve voter confidence.  This, disturbingly, threatens to intensify white 
identity politics.  It is disconcerting to think that state legislatures and party 
officials might engage in race-baiting as a means of building support for a 
given measure, then present that public support as a valid state interest when 
in litigation.  At any rate, the first step, as Douglas notes, is simply to require 
states to make an evidentiary showing.338  My argument here advises courts, 
once that requirement is imposed, to ignore voter confidence data when it can 
fairly be traced to racial animus.  Despite the fact that private animus is not 
legally actionable, courts should avoid substantiating the artifacts of white 
identity politics. 
C.  External Political Actors as Race Neutral 
Election law doctrines devote scant attention to those we might think of as 
“external” political actors:  lobbyists, CEOs, partisan media figures, and 
principals in super PACs.  The same is true for election law scholars.339  
Some of this is explained by the fact that they, like the electorate, are not 
state actors.  But these figures are of immense importance to the election law 
environment.  To the extent that they are referenced in the doctrines at all, 
their race is irrelevant. 
In Part II.A.4, this Article started to outline a connection between the 
deregulatory turn in campaign finance doctrine and white identity politics.  
There, I acknowledged that campaign finance doctrine understandably does 
not attend to race, yet suggested that there is nonetheless a relationship 
between the doctrine and white identity politics that is worth at least brief 
consideration.  I return to that topic here. 
 
 337. In Crawford, the majority rested its holding on three state interests. Crawford v. 
Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008).  First, “the interest in deterring and 
detecting voter fraud.” Id. at 191.  That justification has been thoroughly discredited.  Second, 
the “interest in orderly administration and accurate recordkeeping.” Id. at 196.  This interest 
is caused in part by the states’ own inefficiencies.  And third, the “interest in protecting public 
confidence” in the integrity of the process. Id. at 197.  As this Article has argued, this inchoate 
interest is premised on a problematic foundation. See supra notes 324–26 and accompanying 
text. 
 338. Douglas, supra note 201, at 601 (“Often a state will have a valid regulatory or 
economic need for an election law that ties directly to its ability to administer an election fairly 
and efficiently.  But a court should require a state to articulate that need with specificity, 
instead of resting on generalized and amorphous notions of ‘election integrity’ without any 
evidence of the harm the state is actually trying to combat.”). 
 339. For exceptions, see generally Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance:  
Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105 (2008); Robert Yablon, Campaigns, 
Inc., 103 MINN. L. REV. 151 (2018). 
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Campaign finance doctrine draws a dividing line between contributions 
and expenditures.340  The former may be regulated based on the government 
interest in preventing corruption; the latter, which in the eyes of the Court 
does not pose a threat of corruption, may not.341  It was this divide that 
informed the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,342 which struck 
down limits on corporate-financed independent expenditures.343  A 
subsequent D.C. Circuit case, SpeechNow.org v. FEC,344 further established 
that super PACs—organizations that make only independent expenditures—
may receive unlimited contributions.345  In short, campaign finance doctrine 
has evolved in a way that has greatly strengthened these “outside” 
organizations.346 
Candidates for both federal and state offices heavily rely on outside 
organizations, which are unaccountable to the public.  One of the more 
memorable instances of an outside organization playing a role in an election 
was when the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth—a 527 organization—ran an 
advertisement questioning the military service of then–Democratic 
presidential nominee John Kerry.347  The ad severely weakened Kerry’s 
image and cost his campaign substantial time and money to refute. 
A robust body of academic work has examined the hazards presented by 
an electoral system that relies so heavily on democratically unaccountable 
outside groups for candidate selection and that has such an impact on 
governance.  An associated problem is the incitement of white identity 
politics by organizations that can operate with impunity.  Disclosure laws, 
while in place, are easy to circumvent, resulting in the airing of racially 
inflammatory, though anonymous, advertisements.  Even when funders are 
known, they can disclaim association with a candidate or elected official, as 
was the case with William Johnson, a Los Angeles attorney who ran pro-
Trump advertisements designed to “resonate with white nationalists and 
similar groups.”348 
 
 340. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–26 (1976). 
 341. Sellers, supra note 15, at 372. 
 342. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 343. Id. at 365. 
 344. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 345. Id. at 694 (“[I]ndependent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid 
pro quo corruption, [so] contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also 
cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.”). 
 346. Scholars even refer to these organizations as “shadow parties.” See, e.g., Joseph 
Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over:  McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the 
Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 177. 
 347. See Kate Zernike, Kerry Pressing Swift Boat Case Long After Loss, N.Y. TIMES (May 
28, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/washington/28kerry.html [https://perma.cc/ 
K9MF-JPC3]. 
 348. Lisa Mascaro, White Nationalist Super PAC Funds New Radio Ads Urging Votes for 
Donald Trump, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2016, 5:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/ 
trailguide/la-na-live-updates-trailguide-1475796706-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/UKS2-
EF55]; see also Jane Mayer, Attack Dog, NEW YORKER (Feb. 13 & 20, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/02/13/attack-dog [http://perma.cc/A6C5-XJNY] 
(describing an Islamophobic advertisement). 
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In thinking through this issue, one might conclude that a more robust 
regulatory apparatus, backed by campaign finance doctrines that were less 
libertarian in orientation, might serve to mitigate white identity politics in 
this sphere.  Such a view would nicely dovetail with the scholarly arguments 
in favor of reconstituting political parties as potentially unifying entities.349  
There are, however, two serious rebuttals to this line of thought. 
First, as recited in Part I, the Republican Party is increasingly brazen in its 
employment of white identity politics, suggesting that it is no less inclined to 
run racially charged advertisements under its own banner.  The party’s most 
recent nominee for governor of Virginia essentially admitted to doing so in 
his failed effort to win.350  And such advertisements were ubiquitous in the 
lead-up to the 2018 midterms.351 
Second, a seemingly much larger threat exists in internet media, a 
landscape that is currently largely unregulated.  Therefore, any doctrinal shift 
that might indirectly weaken outside political groups, and thereby, as the 
argument goes, additionally mitigate white identity politics, must contend 
with the fact that online advertisements swamp the figurative marketplace.  
Many online advertisements are intended to foment white identity politics.  
A study of the 3517 Facebook advertisements bought by the Russia-based 
Internet Research Agency found that over half made express references to 
race.352  It is likely the case, then, that while important to acknowledge, the 
indirect relationship this Article has sketched between campaign finance 
doctrine and white identity politics is of little practical significance.353 
IV.  DAMPENING WHITE IDENTITY POLITICS 
With regard to what has been described, what options exist for mitigating 
white identity politics?  In this final Part, this Article suggests some 
interventions.  Some are significantly more plausible than others, and the 
inquiry is not meant to be exhaustive.  But we should think broadly as we 
contend with the racialization of our politics. 
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remain the broadest aggregators of diverse interests.”). 
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 351. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Two Years and Hundreds of Inflammatory Ads Later, the 
G.O.P. Is the Party of Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/06/us/politics/republicans-midterms-trump-racial-division.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4BB3-69KM]. 
 352. Nick Penzenstadler, Brad Heath & Jessica Guynn, We Read Every One of the 3,517 
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 353. Erwin Chemerinsky, False Speech and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 14 
(2018) (“I also worry at how the internet and the ease with which it allows speech may be 
increasing the polarization within the United States.  I believe that such polarization is the 
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A.  Modifying the Constitutional Standard 
Current equal protection doctrine requires plaintiffs alleging intentional 
discrimination based on race to support those allegations with proof of a 
discriminatory purpose.354  In determining whether “a discriminatory 
purpose has been a motivating factor in [the government’s] decision,” courts 
consider a range of “circumstantial and direct evidence.”355  Traditionally, 
the most probative evidence has been the discriminatory “impact of the 
official action,” the “historical background,” the “specific sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision,” deviations from “the normal 
procedural sequence,” and the relevant “legislative or administrative 
history.”356 
Might the deleterious effects of white identity politics justify a 
modification of this constitutional standard in certain contexts?  For instance, 
could the mere fact that a voting regulation or redistricting plan will have a 
disparate impact on minorities and received predominant support from 
Republican legislators prove sufficient to presume its unconstitutionality? 
Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos embraced a standard of this sort in her 
decision striking down Texas’s voter identification law as intentionally 
discriminatory.  Despite the absence of any “smoking gun” evidence, she 
found the legislative session in which the law was enacted to be a “racially 
charged environment.”357 
In an insightful article in the Columbia Law Review, Professors 
Christopher Elmendorf and Douglas Spencer offer a similar suggestion.  
Though their suggestion is tethered to section 2 of the VRA rather than the 
Constitution itself, they understand section 2 to require plaintiffs to establish 
a connection between disparate impact and “the present-day risk of 
unconstitutional race discrimination in the electoral process.”358 
Specifically, they advocate for an inquiry focused on both disparate impact 
and political incentives: 
Th[e] political incentive to discriminate most clearly arises when there 
is a strong correlation between voters’ race and their reliability as partisan 
voters (or as consistent voters for any other established political faction).  
Blacks, for example, are reliable Democratic voters.  So when Republicans 
hold the reins of power, they have political incentives to diminish black 
turnout.  In recognition of this incentive, courts might deem the [plaintiffs’ 
burden] presumptively satisfied in cases brought by black voters against 
Republican-enacted voting requirements or redistricting plans so long as 
the plaintiffs show disparate impact and establish that the political incentive 
 
 354. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
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 356. Id. at 266–68. 
 357. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in 
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 358. Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 295, at 2148. 
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to discriminate holds in the defendant jurisdiction, not just in the nation 
generally.359 
This approach would require courts to dispense with the presumption of 
legislative good faith.360  And it would resuscitate the debate over how to 
best understand the Court’s decision in Rogers v. Lodge.361  But it would be 
one means of responding to the salience of white identity politics. 
B.  Permitting Minority Aggregation Claims 
Courts are divided on the question of whether two or more minority groups 
may collectively bring claims under section 2 of the VRA.  Recall that 
Gingles introduced three prerequisites that continue to structure VRA vote 
dilution doctrine.  The first of those prerequisites requires plaintiffs to 
establish that they are sizable enough to constitute a majority in a single-
member district.362  The second requires a showing of political cohesion.363  
The Supreme Court has never provided a definitive answer to the question of 
whether two or more minority groups may aggregate their numbers in 
satisfaction of the first prerequisite,364 and, with regard to the second, courts 
have struggled to evaluate political cohesiveness between minority 
groups.365   
A judicial commitment to mitigating white identity politics would permit 
minority aggregation claims.  It would reflect the fact that measuring 
intraracial political cohesion is less significant than section 2’s commitment 
to combatting race-based political inequality.366  Thus, Gingles’s political-
cohesion prong should be thoroughly relaxed when two or more minority 
groups align, with courts considering simply whether both groups are 
vulnerable to the effects of white identity politics. 
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 360. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). 
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C.  Encouraging the Construction of Crossover Districts 
A “crossover district” is a district in which “the minority population, at 
least potentially, is large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help 
from voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to support 
the minority’s preferred candidate.”367  Under existing law, redistricting 
bodies are not required to create crossover districts in order to avoid section 2 
VRA litigation.368  In other words, minority voters may not use the VRA to 
create districts in which they have substantial, though not dispositive, 
influence.  Nor may states replace effective crossover districts—that is, 
districts that have in the past elected minority-preferred candidates—with 
majority-minority districts.369  If a crossover district is performing, there is 
no reason to further pack it with minority voters.  Yet redistricting bodies 
retain legal permission to create such districts. 
The puzzles presented by crossover districts are nothing new.370  In theory, 
such districts hold several benefits.  White voters will, ideally, develop trust 
in minority legislators and perceive them as effective representatives.  In 
time, racially polarized voting will diminish.  Either counts as a means of 
mitigating white identity politics.  None other than Representative John 
Lewis, the famed African American civil rights hero from Georgia, supported 
the construction of crossover districts in his home state in lieu of “safe” 
districts that included unnecessarily high numbers of African Americans.371 
While not judicially mandated, crossover districts should be promoted by 
voting and civil rights organizations and, perhaps most importantly, 
Democrats with input into redistricting decisions.  There is precedent for 
this.372  Crossover districts might have a stronger chance of being constructed 
were redistricting to be turned over to independent redistricting commissions.  
While the complexities of this issue warrant contextual analysis from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, on balance, crossover districts should be 
supported. 
D.  Continuing the Development of the VRA Vote Denial Doctrine 
As described in Part II.A.3, section 2 of the VRA—traditionally used as a 
means of challenging vote dilution—has of late been used to challenge 
practices that actually deny individuals the right to vote, either entirely, in 
the case of voter identification, or temporarily, as in the case of states’ 
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elimination of early voting days.373  Recall that courts have started to develop 
a two-element test to adjudicate these matters.  First, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the challenged practice “impose[s] a discriminatory burden 
on members of a protected class, meaning that members of the protected class 
‘have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.’”374  Second, 
the challenged practice “must in part be caused by or linked to ‘social and 
historical conditions’ that have or currently produce discrimination against 
members of the protected class.”375 
In applying the second element, courts have turned to the Senate report 
that accompanied the 1982 amendments to section 2 for guidance.376  In 
particular, they have relied on the final Senate factor—“[w]hether the policy 
underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting 
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is 
tenuous.”377 
The emergence of “tenuousness” as a factor of note in vote denial cases 
holds promise as a means of mitigating white identity politics.  It not only 
shifts the burden to the state to justify a given practice,378 it crucially provides 
an avenue for examining the nexus between race and politics.  The synonymy 
between white and Republican voters in most jurisdictions substantiates 
Professor Karlan’s argument that “[a] policy of pursuing partisan advantage 
through restricting the right to vote should be held tenuous as a matter of law 
and should create a strong presumption that a plaintiff who has satisfied the 
two elements of the emerging framework has established a violation of 
section 2.”379 
I would further highlight two additional Senate factors—“whether political 
campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals”380 and 
“whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected 
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group”381—as factors that could be refined so as to respond to white identity 
politics. 
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E.  Encouraging Open Primaries 
Those who strongly identify with the Republican Party are most likely to 
be participants in white identity politics.  And the same individuals are also 
most likely to participate in primary elections, which, as has been 
documented by both scholars and journalists, tend to attract more staunchly 
ideological voters.382  As a result, closed primary elections—that is, 
primaries in which only registered partisans may participate—have been 
found to produce more extreme candidates.  In contrast, the use of semiclosed 
(where registered partisans and independents may participate) or open 
primaries (where all registered voters may participate) increase the chances 
of the opposite occurring.383  And if effective in this regard, they would have 
the ancillary benefit of reducing white identity politics. 
F.  Broadening the Electorate 
Though ultimately an empirical question, many political observers believe 
that an expansion of the electorate would result in decreased polarization and 
political contention.  The argument, as put by Thomas Mann and Norm 
Ornstein, is that “[h]igher turnout would pull more citizens with less-fixed 
partisan and ideological commitments into the electorate.”384  If true, there 
would be less incentive for the Republican Party to inflame white identity 
politics.  Indeed, this was a pillar of the party’s plan to absorb the rapidly 
increasing Hispanic share of the electorate.  Only time will tell if this 
opportunity has been lost.385 
In general, though, efforts at both the federal and state levels to expand the 
electorate should be encouraged.  These include enforcement of existing 
voter registration laws,386 experimentation with methods of making voting 
easier, whether by mail or online, and the fostering of a culture in which 
voting is valued. 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the primary lessons of our current moment is that race continues to 
inform our political and social relations in complex and often poignant ways.  
In the current state of election law doctrines, that complexity is lost.  A 
presumption of good faith is afforded to political actors, even when 
unjustified based on past and present behavior.  Politics and race relations are 
segregated in judicial doctrines, despite their increased coalescence.  These 
racial blind spots are an accomplice to the perpetuation of white identity 
politics. 
However, there is no single judicial antidote to be found.  In fact, much of 
what I have documented demonstrates how adaptive white identity politics is 
in response to doctrinal change.  The institutionalization of majority-minority 
electoral districts was followed by political profiteering and the increased 
racialization of the political parties.387  The VRA is now used as an expedient 
for further segmenting the population on racial lines beyond what is 
needed.388  Election restrictions abound in the shadow of a doctrine under 
which racial motivations are unlikely to be detected.389  There is a risk, then, 
of unfairly assigning blame to courts, when in fact the heart of the problem 
lies elsewhere. 
While true, this view is too charitable.  Whatever the institutional 
orientation courts may have toward formalism, election law is a context in 
which realism “at the retail level”390 is essential.  As long as white identity 
politics continues to play such a defining role, we will be reliant on courts’ 
ability to discern both when and how it operates when adjudicating election 
law disputes.  Litigants and scholars should therefore work to uncover and 
expose its existence and, in turn, develop legal theories under which it might 
be dampened.  This Article has sought to do both.  Further efforts to these 
ends are critical as we continue the unending journey toward democratic 
excellence. 
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